





A D O L F O G U R R I E R I 
U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
SANTIAGO, CHILE/DECEMBER 1979 
C E P A L 
Review 
Number 9 December 1979 
C O N T E N T S 
Latin America on the threshold of the 1980s 
Enrique V. Iglesias 7 
The periphery and the internationalization of the world economy 
Aníbal Pinto 45 
Commercial bank finance from the North and the economic development of 
the South: congruence and conflict 
Robert Devlin 69 
Exports and industrialization in an orthodox model: 
Chile, 1973-1978 
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis 95 
José Medina Echavarria: an intellectual profile 
Adolfo Gurrieri 115 
Notes and Comments: 
Two statements at La Paz: Raúl Prebisch and Gabriel Valdês 
Two statements at the ILPES/CEPAL/UNICEF Course on Social 
Planningt Jorge Méndez and Carlos Martinez Sotomayor 171 
Some CEPAL publications 185 







José Medina Echavarria is one of*the most important 
sociologists of Latin America, and he was the soci-
ologist who has exerted most influence in CEPAL, 
where he worked with minor interruptions from 
1952 until his death in 1977. This article seeks to 
give an overall view of his work, with the central 
purpose of showing the mainstream that is to be 
found by the serious reader of Medina's work. 
Medina 's thinking forms a contribution of the 
highest value for all those who are seeking to 
formulate an integrated theory of development or 
social change. Medina began by giving his concep-
tion oí social science a strict basis, because he 
considered that it constituted an essential instru-
ment for the rational reconstruction of society (chap-
ter I of this paper); he went on to carry out a lengthy 
examination of the particular object of sociology in 
comparison with the other social sciences and es-
tablished a basic conceptual framework (chapter 
II); h e used this conceptual framework to lay the 
foundation of the sociology of development, a task 
which culminated in his presentation of the "social 
conditions of development" (chapter III); he used 
these conditions as tools for analysing the history of 
Latin America and evaluating its present situation, 
and in the light of this situation, which he consid-
ered to b e very unsatisfactory, he stressed above all 
others the intrinsic values of democracy as a form of 
social coexistence, underl ined its compatibility 
with the pursuit of economic development through 
planning, and defended it from economistic attacks 
(chapter IV). Medina's last work was to make a 
prospective examination of the hopes that exist for 
international détente and internal democracy in the 
light of the probable scenarios for the world order 
(Epilogue). 
Technical Secretary of the Review. This essay was 
presented by the author in lectures which he delivered at 
the Centro de Capacitación para el Desarrollo (CECADE) 
in Mexico in July 1979. 
Introduction* 
Died, did you say? No! alt we know of this, 
Is that he left us by a shining path, 
Charging us only that we should not mourn, 
But should remember him through work and hope, 
Striving for goodness; seeking only that, 
Which he so freely gave us: his great soul. 
(Antonio Machado) 
We Latin Americans are enthusiastic devourers 
of theories. We do not savour them slowly, 
endeavouring to extract their essence with 
pleasure, but gulp them down rapidly, either to 
incorporate them whole or, on the contrary, to 
make them disappear and, at the same time, 
eclipse those who created them. How social 
science has suffered —and still suffers— from 
this fatal combination of uncritical acceptance 
and absolute rejection I 
For this reason the spread of Medina's 
thought has lessened markedly in recent years. 
It is true that Medina was never a saint who 
provoked great devotion among social scien-
tists in Latin America, but he did have his 
periods of great prominence —in Mexico in the 
first half of the 1940s, or when, from Santiago, 
he contributed to the vogue of the sociology of 
development between the end of the 1950s and 
the beginning of the 1960s. However, in his last 
years he had the feeling that publishing his 
papers was more or less equivalent to throwing 
them into the sea; and he certainly believed 
that many of his colleagues in CEPAL, with 
whom he spent almost 25 years, shared in that 
indifference. 
The fact that Medina's approach does not 
form part of the currently dominant sociolog-
ical school in Latin America does not provide 
a complete explanation for the fact that his 
views barely took hold in these parts. Consid-
ering the undisputed potential richness of his 
work, it is clear that there are other reasons 
*Among the many colleagues who kindly encouraged 
me and offered their comments I should particularly like to 
mention R. Cibotti, N. González, J. Graciarena, A. Ntiñez 
del Prado, A. Pinto, R. Sanchez, E. Torres Rivas and M. 
Wolfe. G. Weinberg ungrudgingly allowed me to benefit 
from his erudition and patience, while R. Prebisch not only 
discussed the entire text in detail, but also, through his 
example, constantly reminded me of the value of 
intellectual effort. 
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which hindered its spread. Firstly, there was 
his proverbial refusal to use institutional plat-
forms to extol his own ideas —an attitude 
which, rooted in his natural modesty, became 
further consolidated in his mature years as a 
result of a profound weariness which led him to 
avoid the increasingly uncompromising ideol-
ogical struggle. Secondly, the literary style 
which he used in many of his works, especially 
those of his maturity, did not help much to 
ensure that his ideas were understood. 
His essays —-just as his classes used to be— 
are complex elaborations on a central idea; 
from this kernel he moves backwards and 
forwards, shifts his view to all the aspects 
which strike him as relevant, and often makes 
use of digression and parenthesis. He scorns 
categorical statements, and almost never seeks 
to offend the reader by underlining, which he 
felt was like saying "attention, this is what is 
important!" Accordingly he presents his ideas 
in such a way that the reader can penetrate to 
them through elegant expressions and erudite 
suggestions which at times even seem out of 
place, just as reality is often discovered behind 
the apparent disorder of a surrealist painting. 
Consequently, if this posed difficulties for the 
sociologists who surrounded him, what a prob-
lem it must have been for economists, engi-
neers and planners! 
For this reason, the present essay seeks to 
help to revive Medina's thinking and the 
reading of his works, by endeavouring to 
present in a connected way the main ideas set 
forth in his most important writings, using the 
broad strokes that he himself would not have 
permitted. But will these really be his main 
ideas? Will this essay manage to grasp the core 
of his thinking, separating the essential from 
the incidental? With a writer like Medina these 
questions will never have a final answer.1 
J T h e inevitable process of elimination which has had 
to be carried out here has excluded not only Medina's 
occasional reflexions, but also some topics —such as the 
role of education in economic development— which it is 
difficult not to regard as main ideas. The author is aware of 
this shortcoming, for which his only excuse is his personal 
judgement and the fact that it is impossible to further 
lengthen an already rather long article, and expresses the 
hope that other colleagues will analyse these topics 
themselves in order to round out the intellectual picture of 
Medina. 
At all events, whether or not these are his 
main ideas, and whether or not one agrees with 
them, it is certain that they cannot be gaily 
thrown overboard, as he used to lament had 
happened to the ideas of many classical authors 
in his discipline. The weak and repressed 
sociology of Latin America cannot permit itself 
such waste, nor can it spend time seeking what 
has already been made clear, and still less can 
the sociologists and economists of CEPAL do 
this, at a time when neoclassical economists, 
with its simplistic assumptions about society 
and its rejection of sociology, is taking over as a 
paradigm of the social sciences in many coun-
tries. It is precisely this neoclassical domi-
nation that gives Medina's work as a whole an 
unexpected topicality. Few in Latin America 
fought as he did for an interdisciplinary 
approach respecting the scope of each disci-
pline and avoiding the blinkered approach of 
any of the isms. Few fought so hard for an 
economic sociology capable of providing real 
sociological assumptions for use in analytical 
efforts in economics, thus supplying the con-
crete historical content which economics 
usually lacks. Few urged more than he did the 
importance of the political framework of eco-
nomic activities, not only as a vital theoretical 
element but also as a fundamental body of 
ideals relating to human coexistence which he 
placed —as in the case of democracy— in a 
preeminent position. 
Medina's work as a whole represents a 
valuable contribution for all those who wish to 
formulate an integrated theory of development 
or social change. It begins by providing social 
science with a rigorous foundation, since this 
constitutes an essential tool for the rational 
reconstruction of society (chapter I of this 
essay); it continues with detailed consideration 
of the specific object of sociology vis-à-vis that 
of the other social sciences, and establishes its 
basic conceptual framework (chapter II); it 
draws on this conceptual framework in order to 
lay down the foundations of the sociology of 
development, a task which culminates in the 
presentation of the social conditions of devel-
opment (chapter III); it uses these conditions 
as tools for an analysis of the history of Latin 
America and an evaluation of its present situa-
tion (chapter IV); in the light of this situation 
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—which is not at all satisfactory, in his view— 
he highlights above all other values the intrin-
sic value of democracy as a mode of social 
coexistence, underlines its compatibility with 
the achievement of economic development 
through planning, and defends it from attacks 
based on economism (chapter V); and ends 
with an examination of the prospects for inter-
national détente and internal democracy in the 
light of the possible world scenarios (Epi-
logue). 
I 
Science and politics in the early works 
The political significance of the 
methodological problems 
If one examines the whole of Medina's work, it 
is easy to conclude that, although to begin with 
it is devoted to methodological problems, as 
time goes on it acquires an increasingly sub-
stantive character, culminating in the treat-
ment of the most urgent issues of present and 
future sociopolitical organization. Or, put more 
simply, if the logic of the social sciences stood 
at the focus of this concern up to 1940, that 
focus would seem to have shifted towards 
democracy in the 1970s. 
This interpretation of the development of 
Medina's thinking is correct provided it is 
borne in mind that this variation does not mean 
a radical change of perspective, but merely a 
modification of the angle from which he per-
ceives the same problems. This is so because in 
his thinking, as in that of many illustrious 
predecessors, the logic of science and political 
organization, reason and democracy, are inti-
mately linked. 
In the Preface to Sociología: teoría y 
técnica, Medina emphasizes that the social 
sciences should become true sciences, and that 
for this purpose they must meet the necessary 
theoretical and technical requirements —in 
other words, possess a carefully prepared sys-
tem of categories and a unifying scheme, in 
addition to subjecting research to the strictest 
rules. When transformed into sciences they 
will be able to avoid the action of the charlatan 
and the 'mountebank', which is particularly 
important for sociology, since it "has always 
suffered most from improvisation, and this is 
what it is important to nip in the bud among the 
younger elements".2 
But does Medina investigate the philo-
sophical depths of methodological problems 
only in order to provide social sciences with a 
rigorous foundation? Although this aim alone 
would justify the undertaking, Medina does in 
fact go further, since he holds that the social 
sciences should possess the best possible 
scientific foundation in order to play their 
instrumental function properly: in a time of 
crisis the social sciences must respond better 
than ever to the demand that they should serve 
as a guide for human action. Like Comte, a 
century earlier, he demands that the social 
sciences, transformed into genuine sciences, 
should offer substantial assistance in the for-
mulation of a rational policy, in the sound 
management of human affairs. 
Hence the urgent and dramatic nature of 
methodological problems: scientific rigour 
must be achieved not just as a value in itself, 
but as a foundation for a new way of organizing 
human coexistence. "To permit social science 
to commit suicide is equivalent to declaring the 
decline of our civilization to be inevitable."3 
The indissoluble union between science and 
^Sociología: teoría y técnica, 2nd. éd. (Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1946), p. 8. (The first edition 
dates from 1941.) 
3
 "Reconstrucción de la ciencia social" (1941), in 
Responsabilidad de la inteligencia. Estudios sobre nuestro 
tiempo (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1943), 
p.62. 
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politics is undoubtedly one of the basic keys to 
Medina 's entire thinking. 
In the face of the spectre raised by the 
general crisis of those years, Medina therefore 
reaffirms the rationalist ideal of the need for the 
scientific organization of society on the basis of 
the knowledge supplied by the social sciences. 
And in his first writings, between 1939 and 
1943, h e elaborates upon and examines more 
deeply what must, in his view, be demanded of 
the social sciences in scientific and instru-
mental terms. These demands are very numer-
ous, very complex and not always consistent, 
so that in analysing them Medina is obliged to 
enter deeply into many of the problems related 
to the embodiments , forms and limits of reason. 
It is true that Medina's propositions can 
prove Utopian and at times even somewhat 
contradictory —contradictory because of the 
inconsistencies which may arise from the 
scientific and instrumental demands he places 
on the social sciences —but there is no doubt 
that those first essays represent one of the most 
profound explorations of the logic of the social 
sciences ever carried out in Hispanic America. 
The crisis as a backdrop 
Towards the end of the 1930s and the begin-
ning of the 1940s it was almost impossible to 
avoid the feeling of living in a critical period; 
Medina is no exception, and he adds his 
personal experience of the Spanish conflict and 
exile to the more widespread experience of 
economic chaos, the disintegration of many 
liberal democratic régimes and war. 
This awareness of crisis is the point of 
departure for his thinking, and always remains 
the backdrop; however, he never analyses the 
crisis comprehensively because he feels that, 
to a large extent, the task has already been done 
by others. "Analysis of the crisis has been 
carried out from various viewpoints, and all the 
men of my generation have had to deal with the 
subject in some way."4 
4Sociologia: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p . 12. 
Nevertheless, the topic has a central place 
in Medina 's thinking, and it must be recon-
structed on the basis of the various references 
h e makes to it. 
In principle, and whatever the content of 
the crisis, he never regards it as a certain 
indication of a disaster which cannot be 
overcome. For example, in the first pages of 
Sociología: teoría y técnica he analyses the 
situation through which sociology was passing 
at the beginning of the 1940s, under the 
subtit le "continuity or crisis?", and emphat-
ically asserts the primacy of the former. It is 
true, he says, that sociology is suffering from a 
crisis of objectives and methods, but the crisis 
is not of a fundamental nature —as was asserted 
by Ortega— because it does not arise from 
deal ing with a non-existent object or using 
absolutely inappropriate methods. It is, rather, 
a crisis of growth since "as a science it is 
pursuing a process of maturity that marks a line 
of perfect continuity reflected in the constant 
purification of its scientific conscience and of 
the appropriate methods".5 If Medina's 
thinking on this subject is to be understood 
correctly, it must not be forgotten that, in his 
view, the foundations regarding the methods 
and purpose of sociology were laid by Comte, 
and the " l ine of perfect continuity" starts with 
him. In the same way, when in his last essay he 
returns to the "crisis of Western democracy", 
he emphasizes that the crisis must be defined 
"in its strictly etymological sense, as meaning a 
particular stage in the evolution of a system 
which is marked by sufficient symptoms of 
vacillation and disturbance to indicate a state of 
transition, ruling out neither the recovery and 
reinvigoration of the system of its final disinte-
gration and collapse".6 
But what is in crisis? Among the various 
components of the crisis one emerges which, 
because of its importance, makes it possible to 
place all the others in order: reason. He 
conceives the crisis as a phenomenon (or 
process) in which reason (or the process of 
rationalization) plays a fundamental role. 
5Ibid., p. 15. 
Notes on the future of the Western democracies", 
CEPAL Review, N.° 4 (second half of 1977), p. 119 (United 
Nations publication, Sales N.: E.77.II.G.5). 
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If reason is at the centre of the crisis, what 
does he understand by reason? It is difficult to 
answer, because over the years Medina 
changes his view of the nature and relations of 
the various manifestations of reason. In this 
way, it may be said that if all the components of 
the crisis become imbued with significance in 
the light of the role which reason plays in them, 
all the manifestations of reason are ordered on 
the basis of what Medina calls formal ratio-
nality. 
From the sociological viewpoint, Medina 
differentiates —following Weber— between 
various manifestations of reason which consti-
tute types of rational action.7 Among these 
types he highlights formal rational action, 
which is that designed to achieve a given end 
by means of rational calculation (efficient or 
optimum adaptation of means to ends, predic-
tion of consequences, and so on) and the 
functional organization of the elements which 
go to make it up (each component of action has a 
defined role and a defined function). Formal 
rational action is the ideal type of action in the 
field of science, technology and economics, 
and for that reason is usually presented as the 
paradigm for any rational action; such expres-
sions as rational action consistent with aims (M. 
Weber), logical action (Pareto), economic 
action (Robbins), and technical or technolog-
ical or instrumental rationality, are merely 
different names for it. 
To a large extent formal reason is the cause 
of the crisis, but it is also the appropriate means 
of successfully tackling it. "Of course, it is to 
reason that we owe the conditions of this great 
crisis. For it has been the thriumphs achieved 
by reason in its tenacious confrontation with 
implacable nature which have made man ex-
cessively powerful in a partial aspect of his life: 
the most external and fragile aspect. But only 
reason, in turn, can re-establish the balance 
between the intimate, repressed springs of 
action and the mechanism produced by a 
7Medina formulates and presents this typology in his 
essay "La planeación en las formas de racionalidad" (1969), 
which appeared in Discurso sobre política y planeación 
(Mexico City, Siglo XXI Editores, 1972), but it is clearly 
implicit in his early writings, though in a rather embryonic 
form. 
unilateral inventiveness."8 In other words, "in 
order at least partially to dominate the social, 
collective situation, man must use the same 
means he used successfully to impose his will 
to some extent on his natural, physical cir-
cumstances: patient study, previous devotion 
to reality as it really is ... the deployment in the 
face of social reality of the scientific attitude, 
already well tested in other problems".9 
There is no doubt that the Medina of those 
years places enormous trust in the positive 
role which the deployment of formal reason 
could have for man, or, expressed in his own 
words, in the value of science for human life. 
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the error 
of assuming that, in those initial stages, Medina 
is naively convinced of the gradual advance of 
reason in history, for a reality as complex as that 
of those years naturally ruled out any evolu-
tionary, linear view of human events. From his 
very first writings, Medina observed the dif-
ficulties provoked by the deployment of 
reason, and with the passing of the years 
reaffirms that conviction. 
In his first writings Medina suggests that 
the principal meaning of the crisis of reason is 
none other than that of a unilateral devel-
opment of reason in favour of the dominion of 
nature without a parallel concern for man and 
society. Broadening this point of view, in an 
essay dating from 1939 he sketches an approach 
to the crisis which centres around the process 
of rationalization and combines the vertical and 
horizontal perspectives of social change.10 
In formulating his approach Medina was 
probably influenced by K. Mannheim's theory 
of the disproportion between the high level 
reached by man in the knowledge and domi-
nation of external nature —which is expressed 
in the development of the natural sciences and 
of the techniques linked to them— and the poor 
progress he has made in knowlegde and control 
of himself and society. Moreover, there are 
8
"Reconstrucción de la ciencia social", in Responsa-
bilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 63. 
9
"Sentido y función de la Sociología" (1939), in 
Responsabilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
lü
"Configuración de la crisis" (1939), in Responsa-
bilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., pp. 157-182. 
12Ü 
indications that he also considers the thesis, so 
common in the English-speaking world in 
those years, which contrasts the great progress 
of 'material' culture with that of 'spiritual' 
culture; in other words, the imbalance between 
scientific and technical development and the 
development of the principles which guide 
political, educational, religious, family and 
other activities. 
Nevertheless, as already noted, Medina 
does not share the evolutionary assumptions 
which underlie many of these theories. Fol-
lowing in the steps of Alfred Weber, he holds 
that human history is made up of three funda-
mental processes —civilizing, social and cul-
tural— but only the first of these, which has 
scientific and technical development as a nu-
cleus, can be conceived as linear and evolu-
tionary, while the others, though they manifest 
features reflecting a degree of evolution, tend 
to be specific to each of the 'historical bodies'. 
As a result, from this viewpoint, the crises 
should be interpreted as maladjustments or 
contradictions which occur between scientific 
and technical progress and the socio-cultural 
order in which this progress occurs. 
Furthermore, these contradictions must 
not be perceived only 'vertically', over a period 
of time which is the same for all men, whatever 
their civilizing, social and cultural differences, 
but also horizontally, in other words as a result 
of the coexistence of groups or 'peoples' with 
different historical tempi. This coexistence of 
different and unequal groups and peoples 
leads to a wide variety of relationships —from 
the 'dissemination' of ideas and institutions to 
economic and political conflict— which usual-
ly produce profound disturbances. 
Conceived in this way, within a multi-
dimensional perspective which combines the 
horizontal and vertical approaches, this con-
ception of the maladjustments of the process 
of rationalization is of great theoretical impor-
tance for Medina, to such a point that it will 
appear later in his first essays on the sociology 
of development. The social conditions of scien-
tific and technical development, social adapta-
tion to the new type of life which is being 
created, and its positive and negative social 
effects, form the background to the theory of 
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the conditions and consequences of economic 
development.11 
However, for many of those who have 
reflected on this subject, the problems gener-
ated by the development of formal rationality 
are not limited to disproportions in its applica-
tion to nature, society and culture, but also arise 
in relation to its 'excesses' and the results 
which these may have on the other forms of 
rationality or other types of rational action. 
When Medina raised these problems for the 
first time, two critiques of the process of formal 
rationalization were very much in vogue. On 
the one hand, Mannheim12 argued that togeth-
er with formal rationality —which he called 
functional— there existed substantial ratio-
nality, which he defined as "an act of thinking 
which reveals an intelligent view of the rela-
tions existing between the facts in a given 
situation". This "intelligent view", which is 
necessary to guide human action, requires a 
fairly full perspective of the situation, but the 
shaping of this perspective is, paradoxically, 
disturbed by the development of formal ratio-
nality, which, with its constant division of tasks 
and functions, makes knowledge partial, pre-
vents the majority of the population from 
having a reasonably complete view of the 
society as a whole, and concentrates the power 
and the substantial rationality in the ruling 
minority. Medina does not deal with this ver-
sion of the crisis of reason in his first writings, 
but it is clear that he believes that the social 
sciences can contribute to meeting Mann-
heim's demand that a better balance should 
be achieved between formal and substantial 
rationality. Medina feels that the role of science 
in the development of formal rationality is 
undeniable, but it is important to emphasize in 
addition the role it plays in relation to substan-
tial rationality. Following Dewey, he affirms 
u T h i s is also a very important point of'contact between 
economic and sociological theory in CEPAL thinking, 
since the multidimensional perspective for the analysis of 
social change proposed by Medina has much in common 
with the viewpoint used by Prebisch in considering 
economic development: that of the penetration of technical 
progress into the peripheral social structure. 
l2Libertad y Planificación Social, translated by Rubén 
Landa (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1942), 
p . 52. 
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that "at this point what matters is not the 
present results of scientific research, its body of 
doctrine, so much as the scientific attitude, that 
position of the spirit and behaviour which, 
amongst other features, is manifested in the 
capacity to use ideas as hypotheses subject to 
verification and proof, and not as dogmas. In 
this regard the future of democracy depends on 
the growth and predominance of the scientific 
a t t i tude" . 1 3 
Other writers —notably W. Dilthey—hold 
that formal rationality, as a result of its origin in 
the natural sciences, is content to provide 
knowledge of meaningless empirical data 
—the disenchanted world of Weber— and that, 
accordingly, another rationality (later called by 
Medina 'material') is needed to make it pos-
sible to grasp the 'meaning', 'significance' or 
'value ' of human activities. 
Medina considers this point of view and 
devotes a large part of his works of those years 
to demonstrat ing—in this case following in the 
steps of Max Weber— that while many of the 
'data' of social science, in contrast to those of 
natural science, are defined by their meaning, 
this in no way means that they cannot be 
scientifically analysed. Material rationality 
—conceived as interpretative rationality or 
understanding— must be combined with the 
explanation and prediction specific to formal 
rationality in the methodical perspective of 
social science. 
Everything indicates, then, that this sec-
ond form of viewing the crisis of reason 
—which critically analyses the evolution of 
formal reason in order to point out its limits 
(what it can not offer) and its excesses (what it 
claims to offer without being able to do so)— is 
only hinted at in Medina's early thinking and 
that, in addition, he feels that the problems this 
raises will be solved to a large extent through 
the proper development of the social sciences. 
Nevertheless , as the years pass Medina gives 
this view of the crisis an increasingly important 
role as a consequence of a clearer and less 
optimistic view of the function of formal reason 
in human life. 
13
"John Dewey y la libertad" (1939), in Responsabili-
dad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 269. 
The failure of the social sciences 
After this rough outline of the backdrop of his 
thinking, we must pose the specific question 
which occupies Medina in those years. In his 
words: "is the already intolerable state reached 
by our civilization susceptible of being cured 
by reason, or must we abandon ourselves hope-
lessly to the play of blind forces?";14 "how can 
we understand one another amidst this chaos 
and disorder?"; "how can we renew our history 
without destructive convulsions?".1 5 
Since within this "cure by reason" science 
is the fundamental medicine, we must ask: 
what has been and what should be the role of 
social science?; how has it responded to the 
challenge of the crisis?; must it be reconstruc-
ted so that its contribution is in line with what 
is expected of it?; and if so, how should we 
guide this reconstruction? For Medina, the 
response of social science to the crisis has been 
and remains rather discouraging, since he 
seems sure of the "complete uselessness of 
social science for solving the real problems of 
our everyday l ives".1 6 The success of natural 
science in the nineteenth century in the sphere 
of nature fed hopes of a similar triumph in the 
human sciences; but once these came up 
against the crisis, the result was "frankly 
negative". 
There are three reasons for this failure. 
Firstly, the poor links between theory and 
praxis, the "unbridgeable distance between 
what appears as a scientific construct and what 
we experience and perceive as reality", be-
tween experience of life and what seems 
nothing more than an 'honourable fantasy'. The 
construction of theory in the social sciences 
was guided by the desire to "refine as much as 
possible the traditions inherited from the vari-
ous schools",1 7 and in this task it has been 
usual to get lost in "'profound' thinking which, 
rooted in a vitally urgent human need, hoists 
14
"En busca ele la ciencia del hombre" (1942), in 
Responsabilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 29. 
15
"Responsabilidad de la inteligencia" (1941) in the 
book of the same name, op. cit., p. 16. 
16
"Reconstrucción de la ciencia social" (1941), in 
Responsabilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 42. 
17Ibid., pp. 43 and 46. 
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itself up, in fascinating attraction, until it finally 
hangs over a bottomless void".18 This abysmal 
suggestion of those who practice such 'intel-
lectual mountain climbing' has carried social 
theory away from the urgent decisions of every-
day life and has discredited intellectuals in the 
eyes of the common man. 
This gap between theory and praxis takes 
different forms in the different social sciences. 
In economics, conventional economic theory 
effects analyses which appear fragmentary, in 
that they can not take into account all the 
significant factors in a very complex situation; 
out of date compared with reality, because of 
the great dynamism of the latter; and too gen-
eral to deal successfully with problems which 
arise in unique circumstances. For that reason, 
economic theory —timeless, closed in its de-
ductive consistency, and free of empirical 
contrasts— is not valid for a reality which is 
"interdependent, dynamic and capable of 
being grasped only in the fullness of its circum-
stantiality".19 The gap between political theory 
and reality does not even have the excuse of 
being based on a methodological position, 
since it often only represents the defence of an 
inapplicable general formula, and historical 
theory converts it into antiquarian ism and 
erudition, enabling the past to attract and 
'enslave' the present. 
The second cause of the uselessness of 
social science lies in the widespread accep-
tance among scientists of the criterion of ob-
jectivity based on neutrality in values, i.e., the 
view that science neither can nor should 
decide which values should guide conduct But 
the facts of social science are mostly values, 
and as a result accepting these facts without 
subjecting them to rational analysis merely 
amounts to upholding the status quo. "If this 
is all your objectivity amounts to, then you can 
keep it, because it seems useless and suspi-
cious to us is the reaction, and indeed the at-
titude is not always limited to or satisfied with 
such moderate words."20 Such a criterion 
i a
" Responsabilidad de la inteligencia", in the book of 
the same name, op. cit., p. 17. 
19
"Reconstrucción de la ciencia social", in Responsa-
bilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 49. 
20Ibid., p. 54. 
might have been considered acceptable in the 
historical circumstances which produced it, 
but has led to suicidal inhibitions; the refusal 
of scientists to participate in decisions based 
on values weakens their ability to defend their 
own right to truth and freedom of research 
—which is the value that justifies their exis-
tence— and leaves the field open for other, less 
vacillating forces to take the decisions. 
The third cause, closely linked to the first, 
is the 'anarchy of specialization', the marked 
absence of links among the various social 
sciences "which sterilizes their results, by not 
mutually fertilizing them".21 It is true that one 
cannot think without concepts, which are 
always an abstraction, and that it is impossible 
to make progress in science without special-
izing, but it is necessary to seek methods which 
avoid the 'phantasmal monsters' produced by 
short-sighted and compartmentalized special-
ization. 
These reasons explain why the social 
sciences have proved ineffective in dealing 
with the urgent problems of everyday life, and 
why there has been a progressive loss of trust 
in reason. Practical decisions, lacking this 
guide, have been based on elementary empir-
icism, routine or improvisation, and the man in 
the street has often ended up accepting the 
"miraculous" solutions of 'political miracle 
workers', and even supporting the well-known 
aphorism about the revolver and culture. 
In the face of a social science which is 
unreal, fragmentary, neutral and therefore use-
less, two reactions have occurred, which Me-
dina also firmly rejects. Firstly what he calls 
'militant science', which abandons the extreme 
of abstraction to giving over to that of ideolog-
ical belligerence. It should not be forgotten 
that "denying neutrality in values is not equiv-
alent to proclaiming the unrestrained rule of 
partisan interests, but on the contrary the pos-
sibility of finding a limit to it";22 and the limit 
is that of scientific rationality. Secondly, in the 
face of the excesses of theory, it is declared 
that the scientist should dispense with theory 
and deal only with facts. This 'innocent em-
21Ibid.,p.56. 
^Ibid., p. 29. 
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piricisin' piles up data in an unconnected 
manner without observing that data or facts are 
not primary components of experience but, 
inevitably, constructs which derive from hy-
potheses or theories. 
The reconstruction of the social sciences 
It is imperative to reconstruct the social sci-
ences , because they must play a fundamental 
role in the 'cure by reason' of ailing society; 
and this reconstruction implies, firstly and in a 
strict sense, their conversion into sciences. 
They will be genuine sciences when they 
satisfy two conditions, which are so closely 
related that they are more like the two sides 
of a single coin: their results must have been 
obtained using the 'scientific method", and 
their practitioners must be guided by a 'scien-
tific att i tude7 .2 3 
T h e scientific method, as a way of gaining 
knowledge of reality, is not substantially dif-
ferent from the pre-sc i entine procedures by 
which man seeks the same end. Knowledge of 
reality is always a product of the combination 
of practical action and symbolism, but the form-
er—practical action, 'praxis', in short, the exer-
cise of an activity— precedes the second; in 
the cognitive construction of reality "a real 
object is, first and foremost, that which opposes 
us, in other words which stimulates and resists 
our activity".2 4 Practical activity has purposes 
—aims, intentions— which guide its 'direc-
t ions ' and give rise to a selection of the data 
which can be sensed; this selection shapes or 
typifies the reality, highlighting the aspects 
which have the greatest influence on the 
activities being carried out. Thus, reality is 
'constructed' by praxis as a set of 'shapes' or 
'forms'. 
Symbols, especially language, not only 
express feelings and emotions but also make it 
possible, firstly, to 'socialize' reality, to share it, 
s ince "each word includes the symbol of an 
experience communicated and shared";2 5 and, 
^ " E n busca de la ciencia del hombre", in Responsabi-
lidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p . 30. 
^Sociología: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p . 101. 
^Ibid., p . 102. 
secondly, to order and formulate coherently 
the reality previously shaped by the praxis. 
This 'reality' of a practical-symbolic origin is 
the foundation for any conception of the world, 
and the basis for scientific knowledge. 
It is necessary to underline the relation-
ship between praxis and symbol which Medina 
sets forth —in which the former precedes and 
predominates over the latter— in order to 
dispel the assumption that he shares the em-
piricist view —still very widespread in the 
philosophy of science— that it is in the process 
of acquiring knowledge that man constructs 
his reality. Practical activity precedes and 
orients knowledge, and the symbols which 
knowledge uses —concepts and their relation-
ships— do not derive from the arbitrary interest 
of the researcher selecting among an amor-
phous mass of empirical data, but from a reality 
previously shaped by the praxis. 
However, once this fundamental idea has 
been clarified, it is also necessary to underline 
that all real flesh-and-blood men meet, in their 
praxis and their knowledge, an already con-
structed situation where the 'forms' combine 
in a very close and only analytically distin-
guishable way both the praxis which gave rise 
to the reality and the symbol which denotes it. 
I believe that Medina would agree that his 
analysis of the relationship between praxis and 
symbol has a great formal similarity to that 
which many economists establish between 
material and social conditions of production. 
Analysis of the economic activity carried out 
by an isolated individual, "Robinson Crusoe" 
not considered as living in a society serves to 
show the material basis of the process of pro-
duction, which, in a subsequent stage of the 
analysis, is "socialized". However, this ana-
lytical recourse should not lead one to forget 
that in concrete economic activity, the process 
of production appears from the outset to the 
real flesh-and-blood man as an almost insepa-
rable union of material and social conditions. 
The same occurs with the relationship between 
praxis and symbol; the praxis shapes reality 
and the symbol reflects this shape, with greater 
or lesser fidelity, but for the man of flesh and 
blood, the situation is practical and symbolic 
from the outset. 
It might therefore be said that, for Medina, 
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there are various levels of knowledge of reality; 
a 'pre-symbolic' level, which is that of many 
non-human living beings; a 'symbolic-com-
mon' level, which is that typical of language; 
and a 'symbolic-scientific' level, which is sci-
entific knowledge proper; in other words, the 
knowledge which is obtained using the sci-
entific method is only a refinement of the con-
nexion between symbol (concept, hypothesis) 
and praxis (experiment). 
The precedence of praxis over symbol is 
manifested in scientific knowledge in the fact 
that the latter is always preceded by a 'prob-
lematical situation'. "If there were no problem-
atical social situations, social science would not 
exist",26 since they serve as a spur to knowl-
edge. The theoretical 'solution' of the problem-
atical situation often requires a process of'dril-
ling' which enables the analysis to penetrate to 
ever-deeper layers of reality. Of course, in 
order to avoid intellectual abstruseness, the 
theory should also always offer a practical solu-
tion to the problem which gave rise to it. 
This process of drilling through reality in 
the search for an explanation capable of provid-
ing a practical solution to the problem is not 
guided by the facts themselves, as the posi-
tivists believed, but by a 'provisional key' —an 
a priori hypothesis or prejudice— which acts 
as a guide to knowledge. In the cross-fertiliza-
tion between hypothesis and reality ('experi-
ence') the theory is originated, but this theory 
never loses the hypothetical character it had at 
its origin, however large the number of 'con-
firmation' of it, because "there is no conclusive 
experiment, nor can it ever be ruled out that 
some alterations in it will invalidate totally or... 
partially our theoretical construct",27 and it is 
therefore necessary to resign oneself to the 
"relative truths of experimental intelli-
gence".28 Problematical situation, hypothesis, 
relationship between hypothesis and experi-
ence, theory, practical solution, hypothetical 
nature of the theory and attainment of truths 
which are only provisional: these are some of 
mlbid., p. 126. 
27
 Ibid., p. 128. 
28
"En busca de la ciencia del hombre", in Responsabi-
lidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 31. 
the fundamental aspects of the scientific meth-
od suggested by Medina. 
The scientific attitude of the researcher 
should consist fundamentally in accepting and 
practising the norms of the scientific method; 
it follows from this that the scientist must not 
be 'free of values' but, on the contrary, should 
vigorously uphold those which are specific to 
scientific enterprise. Of these values, Medina 
emphasizes the importance of two: humble 
submission to the verdict of experience over 
and above any personal preference, and accep-
tance of theories as hypotheses and not as 
established dogmas, for all knowledge is only 
relative and provisional. 
Medina holds that the social sciences 
should genuinely transform themselves into 
sciences, which means accepting and practis-
ing the scientific method, and although they 
should not imitate the natural sciences in ev-
erything, they must "apply to the social datum 
the procedures of conceptual construction used 
in that science [physics] with evident suc-
cess".29 The scientific method is the same for 
all the sciences, whatever their subject, and no 
special method can be derived for each on the 
basis of the alleged special character of its 
subjects. 
However, insistence on the 'unity of the 
scientific method' does not lead him to forget 
the special difficulties which arise in applying 
it in the social sciences. On the one hand, the 
concepts that they use are usually symbols of 
other symbols, because social phenomena are 
to a large extent symbolic; on the other, they 
are usually very similar to the terms of the com-
mon language and, moreover, refer to a com-
plex and changing reality which can very 
rapidly make them obsolete. At all events, 
although these difficulties can prevent the 
pure application of the scientific method to the 
social sciences, they do not make it less neces-
sary that they should be subject to its general 
principles. 
The instrumental character of the 
social sciences 
Science in general stands at the service of man, 
and must maintain this instrumental character 
^Sociología: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p. 126. 
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by helping him to alleviate his problems. In 
the case of sociology, however, this require-
ment is still more imperative, since it is 
imposed by the very nature of this discipline's 
subject: the forms of human life. "What is 
asked oí it is an orientation for life. This orienta-
tion is, at the same time, a rational clarification 
of the conditions and trends encompassed by 
the social circumstances in which our actions 
occur."3 0 In other words, the instrumental 
nature of sociology is defined as the rational 
clarification of these social circumstances, but 
what does Medina understand by these terms? 
a) The social circumstances and their various 
levels of analysis 
Medina expects that social science should 
guide men not only in a general way, but also 
in their concrete and everyday reality and, ac-
cordingly, that it should help them to under-
stand the specific social situation in which they 
find themselves and provide a little security 
for their behaviour in it. This social situation 
or circumstance appears as a 'concrete whole' , 
which means , firstly, that its parts are inter-
related ( 'whole'), and secondly that it possesses 
particular features which make it a 'historical 
individuali ty ' different from those in the past 
and in the future ('concrete').31 For this reason, 
sociology may be termed a 'concrete science', 
because it endeavours to understand and ex-
plain the 'real structure', the fundamental 
nature of the concrete social circumstance, its 
derivation from another structure and its ten-
dencies . 
Before sketching some of the methodolog-
ical problems presented by this concrete 
nature of sociology, it is necessary to empha-
size how much in advance Medina's thinking 
was. In the same way that, in relation to the 
scientific method, he was far-sighted enough 
to incline towards an approach of the "deduc-
tive hypothet ical" type —which would only 
become widespread many years later— when 
the predominant approaches were empiricist 
or 'comprehensive ' , his insistence on the con-
30Ifcid, p. 71. 
31
 Ibid., p. 74. 
crete nature of sociology led him to propose an 
approach which was to spread in Latin America 
with great success many years afterwards, 
under the name of 'histórico-structural'. For 
the last ten years or so this perspective has 
predominated in social science in Latin Ameri-
ca as the principal banner in the methodolog-
ical struggle against 'structural-functional-
ism', but no one remembers that Medina 
proposed it as early as 1940. 
It is also evident that the far-sighted nature 
of Medina 's thinking is due in good measure to 
the positive influence of Max Weber. However, 
it would be a mistake to think that Medina 
accepts uncritically and in a wholesale manner 
all the propositions made by that thinker. It can 
only be maintained that Medina was a 'Web-
erian' if that is taken to mean that he adopts 
Weber as a "referent", in other words as the 
interlocutor with whom he wishes to discuss 
all significant problems. This 'debate ' pro-
duced agreements and disagreements, includ-
ing among the latter some which are found in 
the approach which Weber proposes for as-
cer ta iningthe 'historical individuality' of social 
circumstances. 
Max Weber believed that the natural and 
social sciences were clearly differentiated by 
their theoretical intention or aim. The natural 
sciences, using the principle of causality, at-
tempt to formulate general laws (valid for all 
t imes and places) which make it possible to 
explain the relationship between phenomena 
and to control or dominate reality. For the 
natural sciences, individual phenomena are of 
interest only as 'cases' which belong to general 
'classes', and the relationships between them 
only in so far as they are manifestations of a gen-
eral law. The social sciences have a different 
aim, since they attempt to understand and ex-
plain historical individualities; they do not aim 
to formulate general laws, but specific relation-
ships be tween individual phenomena, and as a 
result their principle of causality takes the 
form of a 'concrete imputation'; what is of most 
interest in their analysis is that which is indi-
vidual and particular, while that which is 
general is only a 'means' or a 'preliminary task' 
for gaining knowledge of society proper. Both 
use the scientific method, but with a very dif-
ferent approach. 
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Medina fully agrees with Weber that it is 
necessary to analyse concrete situations in a 
scientific manner, but he does not accept the 
sharp distinction that Weber draws between 
natural and social sciences. In his view, the 
natural sciences are also interested in individ-
ual phenomena and the social sciences in 
general phenomena, and moreover it does not 
seem correct to him to agree that some are 
interested only in 'dominating' reality and 
others only in understanding it. 
With regard to this point there are two 
interpretations of Medina's thinking. If one 
accepts the historicist version of M. Weber's 
viewpoint as presented by Medina in his early 
writings, there is no doubt that Medina's 
methodological position falls between the tra-
ditions of Weber and Comte. Medina himself 
gives grounds for this interpretation when he 
states that be tween them they drew the picture 
of the methodological problems of present and 
future social science.3 2 If, on the other hand, as 
seems more correct, Weberian thinking is 
conceived as a combination fluctuating be-
tween the analytical and the concrete ap-
proaches, one may conclude that Medina in-
heri ted from Weber the problem of the coexis-
tence of these approaches, both necessary but 
with different methodological requirements. 
At all events , by refusing to accept the 
existence of a sharp division between the 
approaches of the natural and social sciences, 
and by underl ining the principle of the unity 
of the scientific method, Medina substantially 
increases the requirements placed on the social 
sciences, since these must satisfy both the 
requirements for the generalization of the 
scientific method typical of the natural sci-
ences and the requirements for particulariza-
tion in the concrete analyses called for by the 
instrumental nature of social science. In other 
words, they must combine general with cir-
cumstantial knowledge. 
Medina points out clearly the tension 
produced by the twofold requirement of grasp-
ing the general law and guiding men of flesh 
and blood in concrete circumstances. In the 
particular case of sociology, he believes that 
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the solution consists in developing approaches 
at various levels of generality, which he calls 
historical, structural and analytical. Each pos-
sesses its own specific concepts and laws, but 
they must maintain close links in order to cross-
fertilize each other. In his later writings there 
are few specifically historical analyses, and he 
devotes only one work to presenting the funda-
mental concepts of the analytical approach, 
thus clearly indicating that he prefers the 
structural approach. With regard to this latter 
approach, he reiterates die need to explore 
thoroughly the suggestion made by J. S. Mill, 
and developed by Mannheim, of the 'principia 
media ' , i.e., those relationships among phe-
nomena which, though linked to general laws, 
are specific to a certain level of development 
or a given historical phase. 
At all events, however, the path towards 
the structural and historical approaches must 
be opened by the strict and general categories 
provided by the analytical viewpoint. If it is 
necessary to choose between them because 
the instrumental aspiration contradicts the sci-
entific requirements, these latter must be pre-
ferred. T h e concrete or instrumental nature of 
sociology "indicates only an orientation and a 
service, since as a science it aspires to theory 
and is subject to the norms for the construction 
of science in general" .3 3 
b) Rational clarification: formal or material? 
The tension between the analytical require-
ments of the scientific method and the need for 
the knowledge provided by it to be capable of 
providing guidance in concrete situations 
obliges Medina to diversify the approaches of 
sociology in order to respect both aims and 
avoid a collision between them or the predomi-
nance of one to the detriment of the others. 
However , the definition of the concept of 
'rational clarification' presents him again with 
the problem of the inconsistency between the 
scientific and instrumental aims of the social 
sciences, since they rest on different concep-
tions of reason. 
It has already been said that in those years 
32
 ¡bid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 82. 
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he placed great trust in the role that science 
could play in human life, asserting that it is 
bui l t by means of a 'method' and an 'attitude' 
based on a conception of reason which he calls 
'formal'. The sole aspect of this conception 
which he rejects time and again is its 'neutrali-
ty in terms of values' , because that decisively 
affects the instrumental possibilities of sci-
entific knowledge. What is the purpose of the 
rational clarification of science if it does not 
provide guidance concerning what must be 
done? However, and here is the problem, the 
establ ishment of a normative science is based 
on a conception of reason which is different 
from, and often opposed to, the formal concep-
tion. 
In a rather simplistic way it can bé said that 
this is a distinction between material (absolute, 
total, dialectical, critical, objective, substantial, 
etc.) reason and formal (relative, partial, instru-
mental , subjective, etc.) reason. 
T h e conception of material reason holds 
that it is a "principle inherent in reality" 
(Horkheimer), and accordingly exists not only 
in individual consciousness but in the natural 
and social objective world. The proper use of 
his rational capacity enables man not only to 
gain knowledge of the 'genuine being' , the 
'real nature ' of things, but also to obtain the 
criteria which will enable him to guide his 
conduct properly. To act in a rational manner 
means to do so in harmony with that broader 
order in which man and his purposes are 
included. This conception originated with the 
Greeks , who were dazzled by the possibilities 
offered by the Socratic discovery of the 'con-
cept ' , was strengthened with the Renaissance 
discovery of the 'experiment' , received the 
support of the major part of the rationalists and 
continues to the present day in the widest 
variety of forms, including those rooted in 
utilitarianism and Hegelian marxism. 
T h e conception of formal reason also main-
tains that it can play an important role in human 
life, although much more limited than that 
impl ied by the first conception. Formal reason, 
conceived as the subjective capacity of the 
intellect, can help us to dominate the natural 
and human world, to select in the most appro-
priate way the means of attaining the ends we 
have set ourselves, to foresee the conse-
quences of our actions, to clarify what are the 
values or the conception of the world which 
guide our actions, but it will never permit us to 
learn the 'meaning' of the world in which we 
live, not its genuine nature nor will it be able to 
indicate to us what we should do. 'Objective' 
knowledge, the 'absolute' truth, the 'essential' 
reality, 'correct' values are elusive, timid crea-
tures which can never be completely pinned 
down by formal reason. Although its back-
ground is also longstanding, this school has its 
theoretical foundation in the illuminists, Hume 
and Kant and extends as far as to predominate 
in the present philosophy of science. 
It would be a profound mistake to believe 
that these conceptions of reason are merely 
responses to philosophical subtleties which 
could be left aside; on the contrary, they 
express a problem of considerable political 
importance, which stands at the focus of all 
contemporary doctrines and closely links the 
philosophy of science with political ideals. 
It is clear that Medina fluctuates between 
them because, while the second conception 
seems to him to be the appropriate foundation 
of the scientific nature of the social sciences, 
the first is the appropriate foundation for its 
instrumental nature. And this latter nature, in 
the full meaning in which he uses it —of 
guidance for the proper organization of human 
affairs, for a reconstruction of human coexis-
tence— cannot be reconciled with a scientific 
reason which 'abstains' at the level of values, 
which does not clearly indicate which are the 
decisions which should be taken, and which 
can only achieve relative and provisional 
knowledge. 
It has always been evident that the concep-
tion of material reason underlying the instru-
mental character which Medina demands from 
the social sciences is closely linked to political 
doctrines which firmly aim both at the uphold-
ing and at the transformation of a given status 
quo. T h e names of Plato, Hegel or Marx are 
sufficient examples. In these cases, political 
doctrine demands the legitimacy supplied by 
the possession of the absolute truth and, if the 
foundation of this truth is reason, use will be 
made of a philosophy which ensures that 
reason provides the means of attaining that 
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truth, from which is derived not only objective 
knowledge of reality but also the principles for 
guiding action. How can one firmly justify 
doctrinaire principles if one is not certain of 
possessing the truth? But of course, if the com-
mon epistemológica! derivative of this concep-
tion, which believes that it can reach absolute 
truth, is dogmatism, then its political derivative 
—or antecedent— is absolutism: if the proper 
use of reason makes it possible to possess the 
truth, why should it not be imposed on others, 
who, guided by their interests or blinked by 
ignorance, do not wish to see it as it is? 
The conception of formal reason is 
strengthened in the fight against dogmatism, 
which always lies in ambush for material 
reason, and offers a path of tolerance and effort 
to reach a provisional truth by means of expe-
rience. Formal reason opposes innate ideas, 
revelation, self-evident principles, and the 
predominance of experimental reason. How-
ever, this conception has an obvious 'elective 
affinity' with certain political doctrines, espe-
cially some modem varieties of liberalism, 
which limit the political action which can be 
carried out to the strict limits of the provisional 
truth supplied to us by scientific reason. Sci-
ence can in no case tell us what we should do, 
since this decision belongs to the specific area 
of human liberty; it can only indicate to us 
what we can do. However, this indication is 
also very limited, because of the provisional 
and relative nature of the knowledge which 
scientific reason can provide. If through it it is 
only possible to attain a very fragile truth, it 
will never be possible to hold that there is a 
scientific basis for a political strategy of large-
scale transformation. In such circumstances, 
the rational-or scientific management of human 
affairs should be limited to the application of 
very restricted social engineering. Years after 
the first works of Medina, K. Popper high-
lighted with his political proposals the close 
relationship which exists between an epis-
temological conception based on formal reason 
and moderate political doctrines. This concep-
tion represents an effort to limit the harmful 
political effects of the excesses of material 
reason —whose supreme example is 'terror'— 
and to legitimate scientifically a latitude for 
action which is important for human liberty, 
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but rapidly slips towards the implicit defence 
of the status quo, 
Both conceptions of reason have their 
virtues and defects when they are conceived as 
cognitive and political principles. Formal 
reason is a dissolvent of all kinds of dogmatism, 
at the same time as it helps man to reach his 
goals, but on the plane of values and of ethical 
and political decisions it forbears, giving 
precedence to the free expression of will. This 
'neutrality in values', which for its adherents 
is a guarantee of freedom, is for its critics its 
fundamental defect, since it implies retreating 
before the decisive problem of the choice of 
ends and leaving the way clear not for liberty 
but for irrationalism or technocratism. Who-
ever, like Medina, has watched the spectacle 
of groups and classes destroying each other 
because of their incapacity to reach agreement 
on the ends to be pursued —as in the case of 
the Weimar Republic and in that of Spain at 
the time of the civil war, to cite only two 
examples which weighed heavily on him— or 
the sight of intellectuals refraining from offer-
ing solutions, protected by the neutrality in 
values of formal reason, can have no doubts 
about the danger of conceiving it to be the 
only type of reason possible. When the free 
expression of individual interests leads to 
social harmony, in accordance with the beliefs 
of the original economic liberalism, all that is 
needed is formal reason to enable men to attain 
as efficiently as possible the ends which they 
have freely proposed; but when the conflict of 
individual and social interests leads not to 
harmony but to chaos and anarchy, formal 
reason shows that it is not the appropriate 
instrument for overcoming the crisis of the 
liberal democratic régimes. 
Again and again, in various forms, the 
conception of material reason recurs in western 
thought to fill the tremendous void left by 
formal reason. Its greatest promise lies in 
bridging that gap satisfactorily, but its critics 
do not fail to point out that always inherent 
in it is the very danger which it was the function 
of formal reason to avert: material reason might 
mask behind an appearance of rational or 
scientific knowledge what is in fact the product 
of mere irrational and interested decisions. The 
history of the past and present forms of totali-
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tarianism, with their pseudo-scientific doctrine 
in which they seek justification, is the supreme 
endorsement of an attitude of the utmost 
caution to the spread of material reason. 
In his first period, Medina sets out the 
differences between the scientific and instru-
mental requirements, but does not succeed in 
combining them satisfactorily. When it was 
pointed out to him —by José Gaos, for exam-
ple— that the predominance of rationalist 
determinism would lead to automatism and 
the suppression of freedom, he took refuge in 
formal reason and replied that "...since the 
exhaustion of the scientific fetishism of the 
nineteenth century, present-day science offers 
no grounds for maintaining pretensions to 
absolute knowledge ... Science was the first to 
be converted to historical reason; but it saves 
its relativity in the test of experiencie".34 There 
is no reason to fear that knowledge of the social 
sciences will threaten freedom, since 'it is not 
thus that God punishes us'; the problems do 
not derive from the scientific nature of the 
social sciences, but from the absence of such a 
nature. Ideally, science should offer us the 
solution to our problems, since "rationalism 
and humanism are so intimately united that 
science would lose its raison d'être if it aban-
doned all hope of one day rationally governing 
our social life. However, in its present state 
sociology cannot completely fulfil this assign-
ment, and we must content ourselves largely 
with demanding from it and the social sciences 
the fullest possible rational analysis of the 
conditions of our action".35 
However, these favourable assertions vis-
à-vis formal reason do not leave him satisfied 
either, and consequently Medina returns to 
them repeatedly in his later writings and 
reformulates his considerations concerning the 
problems of reason on the basis of a clear 
distinction between formal and material ratio-
nality. He concedes that, in a strict sense, and 
in accordance with the prevailing philosophy 
of science, scientific reason is only formal 
rationality, and accordingly the moment of the 
decision which involves values —the choice 
"En busca de la ciencia del hombre", in Responsa-
bilidad de la inteligencia, op. cit., p. 31. 
Sociología: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p. 74. 
of what must be done— remains outside the 
sphere of science. Nevertheless, it is not be-
yond the limits of reason, since it is susceptible 
or rational interpretation by material reason. 
Paraphrasing the aged Mill, M. Weber said 
that when emerging from pure empiricism 
one falls into the polytheism of values, and a 
struggle among the gods is then inevitable; but 
Medina becomes progressively convinced that 
the only way of avoiding this struggle is the 
proper use of material rationality. 
In accepting that Values' and 'meanings' 
are susceptible of material rational analysis 
—if not, how could one determine which 
problems are socially important and which are 
not?— Medina moves away from the neo-
positivist positions he held in his early writings 
and moves closer to the 'critical philosophy' 
of the Frankfurt school. To grasp the meaning 
or value of a social action is not the same as 
agreeing with the manifest meaning expressed 
by the actor, nor agreeing to place this action 
in the manifest social whole of which it is part. 
Rather, it is necessary to use the critical 
battering ram of material reason to penetrate 
through the layer of rationalizations and ideolo-
gies until one reaches the profound meaning 
which guides the social action. Material reason 
and critical reason appear in Medina's mature 
thinking; here he not only continues to recog-
nize the achievements of formal rationality, 
but also acknowledges its limits and above all 
the danger that formal rationality, after the fact 
has been separated from the value, the theory 
from the decision, and after the choice between 
values has been placed in the sphere of irratio-
nality, may occupy with its own peculiar values 
—especially that of 'effectiveness'— the gap 
left by material rationality. Already, in 1969, 
he points to the danger of the destruction of 
any form of reason when "it goes beyond the 
field of its effective potentiality",36 and in his 
last essay he reiterates that the "revitalization 
of democracy" depends to a large extent on a 
will "to transcend instrumental rationalism and 
once again found the legitimacy of democratic 
rule on the supreme values of a form of human 
^ " L a planeacion en las formas de la racionalidad", 
in Sociologia: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p. 100. 
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society which has a real significance for man 
and his community".37 
In short, as regards the possibility of a 
'rational policy' it is clear that Medina always 
sought, through all the forms of rationality, the 
most appropriate means of rationally guiding 
conduct. At the outset he placed his trust in the 
rationality of science; later, when he recog-
nized the limits of that type of rationality —its 
inevitable 'neutrality in value'— and the dan-
gers of its excesses, he endeavoured to inte-
grate it with material rationality, in order to 
find a setting which afforded scope for rational 
discussion and agreement, not only on the 
formal relation of means with ends, but on the 
ends themselves. However, when he turned 
E v e n a superficial reading of Medina's initial 
works clearly indicates that they are devoted 
to justifying and firmly defending the scientific 
nature of sociology and clarifying its object of 
analysis. Unfortunately, this is not a discipline 
which has an object and a method which are 
consolidated and accepted, but one full of 
academic and ideological conflicts. 
For this reason his task consists not in 
moving forward easily along the path built by 
his predecessors, but in overcoming with 
difficulty a dense theoretical and methodo-
logical tangle in order to establish firmly the 
essential foundations for the development of a 
rigorous social science: the appropriate use 
of the scientific method and the precise delimi-
tation of its object. Without doubt it would 
have been easier for him to accept from the 
outset some particular theoretical position, 
without asking it or himself bothersome ques-
tions concerning the philosophical assump-
tions on which it was based; but such super-
Notes on the future of the Western democracies", 
CEPAL Review, N.° 4 (second half of 1977), p. 134 (United 
Nations publication, Sales N.°: E.77.11.G.5). 
to material reason and the analysis of the social 
conditions in which it can exist and develop, 
he knew that he had come to the very heart of 
his own cognitive and political utopia. The 
rational conduct of human affairs is possible 
by means of formal and material rationality 
—in other words, rational decisions can be 
reached on the technical and political levels— 
but it is indispensable to create such social 
conditions as will permit the deployment of 
both rationalities. In the absence of these 
conditions, and despite all Medina's efforts 
and hopes, there will be 'no ebbing of the 
towering wave of irrationality that is engulfing 
us ' , since the destiny of democracy is one with 
the destiny of reason. 
ficiality was not compatible with Medina's 
temperament , nor with the principles which, 
in his view, define the task of an intellectual. 
He had to select the most correct 'solution' 
only after a thorough exploration of all the 
options open to him; each of them had to be 
analysed and evaluated in order to grasp and 
retain its positive aspects. This process of 
analysis and evaluation obliges him to go 
deeply into philosophical labyrinths from 
which it is difficult for him to emerge un-
scathed, as has already been pointed out in 
the previous chapter devoted to outlining the 
foundations on the basis of which Medina 
affirms the scientific nature of sociology. 
The task is difficult both for him and for 
anyone who proposes to follow the evolution 
of his thinking closely and in detail, since in 
this explanatory process it is possible to lose 
one's bearings, devote part of the time to 
penetrating along paths which turn out to be 
dead ends, or to allow oneself to be guided by 
brilliant lights which prove to be mere will o' 
the wisps. All this happens to Medina while 
he is seeking the object of the social sciences, 
and since this search is reflected in his writ-
ings, they can prove tiresome for anyone who 
II 
In search of the object of sociology 
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is not determined to travel together with the 
author along the winding road. Furthermore, 
since he is subject to various influences, and 
his intellectual honesty and scientific zeal 
always prompt him to set out all those which 
he deems important, some of his texts can give 
the less alert reader an impression of tiresome 
erudition. 
After analysing the problems relating to 
the scientific nature of sociology set out above, 
Medina devotes the first stage to clarifying the 
scope of the social sciences and precisely 
outlining the sociological perspective. He 
begins this work in a systematic way in the 
mid-1980s —his first sociological work had 
already been written by 1936— continues 
moulding his ideas through books and articles 
dur ing his stay in Mexico, and shapes them 
finally —as far as this subject is concerned— 
towards the end of the 1940s in his Lecciones 
de sociología (Lectures in sociology) given at 
the University of Puerto Rico, of which only 
an incomplete typed version exists. 
It has already been mentioned that be-
cause of his character, open to any useful 
contribution, he is subject to many influences 
from different ideological or academic back-
grounds. It seems clear that even in the initial 
years he is influenced by some authors from 
Germany (M. Weber, K. Mannheim, H . F r e -
yer), France (A. Comte and E. Durkheim), 
England (H. Spencer and M. Ginsberg) and 
North America (J. Dewey, F. Znaniecki and T. 
Parsons). His mature version of the sociological 
perspective basically consists of a combination 
of various European schools of thought, espe-
cially the Weberian school, with contributions 
from the North American school, the latter no 
doubt analysed in detail during his stay in 
Puerto Rico between 1946 and 1952. As is 
well known, this theoretical combination has 
not been attempted only by Medina, since 
various thinkers, each in his own way, have 
endeavoured to follow the same path, among 
the most outstanding examples in the United 
States be ing T. Parsons, C. W. Mills and R. 
Bendix. Parsons' influence on Medina is 
obvious —at least in the 1950s— but as far as 
the others are concerned, there seems to have 
been , rather than a direct influence, the affinity 
typical of the members of a single school of 
thought. 
Social facts: action and situation 
1. A clear idea can be gained of Medina's 
conception of the object of the social sciences 
if his basic assumption is followed through 
from the beginning: just as all the social 
sciences make use of the scientific method, 
they also share a single object—'social reality', 
'social facts'— although they differ in the type 
of social facts with which they deal and/or the 
perspective from which they study them. 
But what does he mean by social reality, 
social facts? Basically these are human activi-
ties, actions, behaviour, by men who act in 
various ways; in short, a "fabric of human acts 
with their antecedents and results".38 These 
human acts, therefore, do not occur in a vacuum 
but have as a framework and influence 'ante-
cedents ' of various kinds and, in addition, 
generate as a product of their own development 
' results ' which can be transformed into the 
conditions for new actions. However, in his 
first writings he emphasizes that the nucleus 
of social reality, human action, must be dis-
t inguished from its antecedents and its results, 
and firmly rejects all conceptions which claim 
to ' reduce ' such action to the latter. 
'Naturalist reduction' asserts that social 
facts are natural phenomena which can be 
grasped with the conceptual instruments of 
natural science and, therefore, that the social 
sciences are natural sciences. This conception 
has a number of variants depending on the 
natural phenomenon in which it is sought to 
blend the social fact; the most widespread 
include those where human behaviour is a 
manifestation of the organic constitution of 
man, an expression of instincts or tendencies 
which constitute his dynamic principles; and 
those which consider it to be a consequence 
of the natural or physical environment. 
T h e 'culturalist reduction' regards the 
social fact as 'cultural' or 'spiritual', as a 
manifestation of culture or of the spirit. This 
conception also has a number of variants 
—historicism, Hegelianism, phenomenology, 
and so on— which postulate the existence of 
totalities of meaning, manifestations of the 
objective spirit or spiritual essences such as 
38Sociología: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p. 56. 
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art, law or morals, and imagine them as ab-
stract, closed and independent entities. 
Medina rejects both reductions. It is 
undeniable that human beings are one with 
their 'animality' and for that reason are subject 
to tendencies similar to those of other species, 
but human action includes something more 
than the natural conditions in which it is 
carried out. It is also true that man is imbued 
with or influenced by culture, and that the 
expressions of culture can be 'grasped' from 
the society in which they arose and can be 
conceived as more or less consistent, ordered 
and independent wholes. However, here too 
it should not be forgotten that they are human 
products and that what is important for the 
social sciences is not these cultural entities in 
themselves, but the activities by means of 
which they recreate and actualize themselves, 
taking form in human behaviour. The 'cultural-
ist reduction' tends to "cut off culture from 
its vital roots, then bring man face to face with 
it and finally, very often, attribute to any one 
of the cultural products a decisive power over 
man himself \3a 
It is true that natural and cultural elements 
are so interlinked that it is often possible only 
to differentiate them analytically; the origins 
of many cultural expressions can be traced to 
their natural basis, while many manifestations 
of internal and external nature are mere by-
products of culture. But human activity cannot 
be reduced to either, or to any combination 
of the two. The irreducible nucleus of action 
by man is the action itself—with its content 
of intention, purpose, aim, meaning— and 
those antecedents and results are only stimuli, 
means, obstacles to it. 
Time and again Medina reiterates that to 
a large extent man —conceived generically 
as a species— creates himself by constructing 
through his activities the circumstances which 
influence his behaviour. Accordingly the 
approach of the social sciences should analyse 
how natural and cultural conditions mould 
human behaviour, and also how man uses these 
conditions —within the framework of his 
specific society— to achieve the aims he has 
mlbid., p. 6. 
set himself or chosen, since it is through this 
choice that he can express his relative freedom 
from these conditions. 
Human activity is included in physical 
and biological nature but transcends it because 
of its 'meaning', whose importance is not 
perceived by naturalism. Culturalism, for its 
part, crystallizes, 'substantializes' this mean-
ing, without pointing out that social reality is 
activity and not crystallized culture. Nature 
and culture are components of human activity, 
but the nucleus of the latter cannot be under-
stood through the separate consideration of its 
components, nor through the exclusive anal-
ysis of its products or results. 
The conception formulated by Medina in 
his first sociological writings on social facts is 
clarified when it is compared with those of M. 
Weber and E. Durkheim. The former holds that 
the specific object of analysis in sociology—in 
sociology alone, and not in the other social 
sciences— is 'social action'. Taking the total 
set of human actions he establishes a distinc-
tion between actions with meaning and be-
haviour which represents a mere reaction. 
Actions with meaning are those to which the 
actors carrying them out give an orientation 
in accordance with certain criteria or principles 
(which are not necessarily nor usually ethical), 
while reactions are mere responses, largely 
automatic, to internal or external, natural or 
cultural stimuli. Among actions with meaning 
he distinguishes social action, which are those 
where the meaning granted to them by the 
actor relates to, or takes into account, the 
actions of others. In other words, a social action 
is not a mere reaction to internal or external 
stimuli, but has an orientation, a meaning, 
which takes into account the actions of others. 
Medina agrees with Weber that actions 
with social meaning —i.e., those related to the 
behaviour of others— are the nucleus of so-
ciology (and, in his view, the other social 
sciences), but does not follow him in the sharp 
distinction he proposes between actions with 
meaning and reactive behaviour, or, as a result, 
in a sociology which leaves aside considera-
tion of the natural conditions of human action. 
In other words, while he does not agree that 
human action should be reduced to its natural 
basis, nor does he feel that it is desirable that 
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the latter should disappear from the analytical 
perspective of sociology. 
According to Durkheim, in all spheres of 
human activity there are 'social facts' which 
are the subject of sociology —customs, prac-
tices, habits, conventions, legal norms, ways 
of acting, thinking and feeling, and so on—and 
which are objective in nature, that is to say, 
exist independently of the individual and, to 
a large extent, are imposed on him. These 
social facts possess an 'objective', 'real' nature; 
they have been created by man but have 
become independent of him and assumed their 
own existence. To man they appear as 'objects', 
with their particular nature, their internal 
logic and their imperative character, especially 
when they have reached a high level of con-
solidation, as occurs with language or legal 
norms. They are not 'material' facts like natural 
facts, but they are just as real; and they are not 
human action, although they manifest them-
selves through it. 
Where Medina differs from Durkheim is 
clear: for the latter social facts are the con-
solidated 'institutions' in which human activity 
takes place, while for Medina they are human 
action itself, the actualization of those institu-
tions. 
2. As early as in his first book, when trying to 
encompass in a single term the particular 
features of social facts —and especially how 
they differ from natural and cultural facts— 
Medina terms them 'forms of life'.140 The echoes 
of E. Spranger in this term do not appear to be 
accidental, since that author also seeks to 
establish a degree of order in the multiplicity of 
individual forms of behaviour through the 
construction of ideal types of 'men' —theo-
retical, economic, political and so on— which 
characterize their conduct through the predo-
minance of one given orientation of meaning 
and value. 
Medina indicates some characteristic 
features of these 'forms of life', which differen-
tiate them from natural and cultural facts. It is 
true that they are less consistent than the 
latter, but they have a characteristic internal 
*° Panorama de la sociología contemporánea (La Casa 
de España en México, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1940), p. 208 et seq. 
n a t u r e . Na tu ra l a n d cu l tura l objects a re 'exter-
n a l ' to h u m a n b e i n g s , but social facts a re 
"specific modes adopted by existence in realiz-
ing itself, and they cover all human life 
because "they would have no existence 
without us and we would have no reality 
without them". We cannot stand outside them 
and observe them as if we were observing a 
storm or a picture, and for that reason they 
form a 'vital reality' which is the object of 
'continuous human execution'; their destiny is 
linked to the destiny of men, and "The forms 
[ human activity ] takes are forms or modes of 
human life itself'.41 
However, it should be mentioned that his 
formulation of social facts varies over the years; 
this is not suprising, since he analyses this 
subject in writings ranging from 1936 to 1955. 
The formulation outlined above corresponds 
to that of the first works, between 1936 and 
1941, and there one can clearly see his ea-
gerness to prevent the social sciences from 
being devoured by some of the naturalist or 
culturalist 'reductionisms' so prevalent at that 
time. Although he indicates the important 
influence of natural and cultural 'conditions' 
on social action, the impression sometimes 
remains that he focuses less interest on them 
because he highlights the specifically social 
component, human behaviour, always in 
action, inflen. 
In subsequent writings he continues to 
affirm the creative and innovative persistence 
of human activity, but devotes much more 
space to the conditions which guide it and 
restrict it, and also makes much more frequent 
mention of Durkheim and his insistence on 
the imperative nature of these conditions. For 
example, in his Lecciones de sociología oí 
1948 (p. 36 et seq.) he reformulates the condi-
tions of human activity with his concepts of 
mentefacts, artefacts and sociofacts.42 
41
 Sociología: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p. 59. 
42Mentefacts are the products of thought, especially 
ideas, which appear in the form of objectified and ins-
trumental symbols; artefacts consist of anything which man 
has made with his hands, from the simplest tools to the most 
complicated machines; and sociofacts are the "construc-
tions of social coexistence", everything which constrains 
behaviour, from the most elementary customs to the most 
complex institutions. They are all creations of man which 
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Even in that text, and more clearly in 
another written in 195543 he modifies the 
meaning of his concept of 'forms of life' to 
include not only human action but also the 
conditions in which it is carried out. These 
cultural, material and social conditions are the 
components of the forms of life which shape 
human conduct by their compulsory nature. 
In addition, there are forms of life which are 
total —those which are specific to the various 
types of civilizations— and partial, which 
correspond in particular to the various social 
institutions and roles prevailing in a given 
society; analysis of the latter was later to 
consti tute one of the favourite subjects of 
analysis in his sociology of development. 
At all events , whatever emphasis Medina 
deemed it advisable to place on analysis of the 
conditions at various stages in the evolution 
of his thinking, there is no doubt that he always 
regarded action, 'social behaviour', as the cen-
tral nucleus of the object of the social sci-
ences.44 
3. 'Social facts' are never finally facts but have 
to generate themselves every day in the re-
pea ted acts which give them reality. But this 
does not prevent them from occurring in a 
relatively ordered form; on the contrary, they 
present 'forms' whose consistency derives 
from the various meanings of the action. If the 
nucleus of social facts is made of activities 
with meaning, the various meanings of the 
exert a wide , changing and omnipresent influence on his 
behaviour. 
4 3
"Tres aspectos sociológicos del desarrollo econó-
mico" (1955), in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económi-
co (Santiago, Ed. Andrés Bello, 1955), p . 82 et seq. 
^ I n his Lecciones he once again emphasizes this 
subject with particular brilliance: "...from the perspective 
of life in general man appears to us as a being in a situation. 
And from this situation, for which in principle he is not 
responsible, he can only escape in order to fall into 
another". But this situation "is in addition something open 
and unfinished, movement within the movement, the 
present moment of the history which we represent. Thus 
we make our history within the history which has made us... 
Within the limits of this fate, within the framework of this 
situation, however, operates the freedom which makes us 
what we are and shapes and modifies the situation itself. It 
is a creative liberty, it makes our personality, society, 
history; but it is not an unlimited and omnipotent freedom, 
for it can never go beyond its situation". Lecciones de 
sociología, (mimeographed version of his lectures at the 
University of Puerto Rico, 1948?), pp. 189-190. 
action are also the criteria on the basis of which 
the various types of social facts, the different 
forms of life, are differentiated. 
Medina distinguishes two aspects in the 
orientation or meaning of actions, which 
constitute an essential foundation for his 
conception of the object of the social sciences. 
T h e various types of action can be differentiat-
ed according to their content or purpose —for 
example, economic, political, religious, mili-
tary, and so on— and by the mode or form in 
which they are carried out (for example, ra-
tional, traditional, affective, and so on). Medina 
finds in the first of these criteria the key which 
enables him to distinguish the various spheres 
of ordered human activity, 
In other words, the individual social scien-
ces concentrate on the study of special types 
of social action differentiated by their aim or 
content. Economics analyses those activities of 
man which are aimed at satisfying his material 
needs; political science those which are aimed 
at meet ing requirements in organization and 
control; and similarly for the other individual 
disciplines which "set out a list of issues 
focused around a particular type of human 
action".45 
Analytical sociology and concrete sociology 
1. But what is the specific object of soci-
ology? 
This question is usually given three typical 
answers which are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive: firstly, sociology might attempt to 
define its object by delimiting a range of 
activities characterized by their 'social' pur-
pose, in contrast to those which have economic, 
political or other purposes; secondly, it might 
focus on the study of a formal aspect or dimen-
sion present in all human activities, whatever 
their purpose; or, finally, it might claim that 
its object is the overall social structure in-
volving the partial spheres to which all the 
individual social disciplines relate. 
Medina rejects the first answer and, 
following Mannheim, holds that sociology 
constitutes its object on the basis of the per-
spectives implied in the two remaining replies; 
^Sociología: teoría y técnica, op. cit., p . 92. 
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in other words, it is at once 'analytical' and 
'concrete ' . 
However, these concepts require clarifica-
tion. Taking one step beyond what has already 
been said in the previous chapter, and inter-
pret ing to some extent Medina's implicit think-
ing, we may assert that these concepts are 
located in an area crossed by two fundamental 
dimensions. On the one hand, the approaches 
vary with the level of abstraction (or con-
creteness) used: there are approaches, con-
cepts and theories which are 'general' in that 
they refer to phenomena characteristic of any 
human society; 'typological' in that they 
endeavour to grasp social facts which are 
specific to certain types oí society, such as, for 
example, the peripheral capitalist societies; or 
' individual ' in that they are interested in 
phenomena belonging to a given society. On 
the other hand, the approaches also vary with 
the unit of analysis regarded as appropriate: 
in this case they range over the broad area 
extending from 'micro-social' analysis of social 
actions and relations at the interpersonal level 
to the 'macro-social' study of broader forma-
tions —groups, institutions and their relation-
ships— at the structural level. Medina makes 
many of his methodological considerations by 
taking as a reference the extremes of this 
combined classification: the general and inter-
personal approach, which he usually simply 
calls analytical, and the historical and struc-
tural approach, which he usually terms con-
crete. 
Analytical sociology has a twofold attrac-
tion for Medina: its constituent elements are a 
necessary condition for any theoretical iormu-
lation, so that the effort devoted to them is 
never wasted, and, moreover, how elegant 
their conceptual constructions are! 
When in Panorama de la sociología con-
temporánea (p. 203 et seq.) he reviews the 
analytical perspective, he does so on the basis 
of the thinking of G. Simmel, one of the most 
energetic builders of this theoretical path. 
Simmel reacts against the encyclopaedist 
tendencies of many classics in the discipline, 
defines social facts in a 'special' and not 'total' 
way, and opposes the theory of socialization 
to the theory of society. He does not try to find 
a new object for sociology, but sets out the 
sociological perspective on the basis of which 
it is possible to analyse the objects already 
investigated by the other social disciplines. He 
believes that he can found this perspective 
on the already outlined separation between 
the 'content' or purpose of the action and the 
'form' or mode in which it is carried out; 
sociology should study the forms assumed by 
human action, whatever their content — in 
short, devote itself to analysis of the 'forms of 
socialization'. 
Subsequently, in Sociología: teoría y téc-
nica, Medina returns to the subject when 
assessing the contribution of F. Znaniecki. 
This author maintains that, while each of the 
individual social disciplines has its own 
sphere, there exist similarities of structure 
be tween them which derive from the fact that 
all study human action, and, for that reason, a 
discipline is needed which formulates a gen-
eral theory of action. For his part, Medina 
emphasizes: "...beforehand, and as a founda-
tion for the detailed research undertaken by 
the individual social sciences on the various 
classes of action, it is possible and necessary 
for someone to study social action in itself 
and construct its theory",46 and this someone 
is the analytical sociologist. All the individual 
social sciences formulate their theories on the 
basis of assumptions relating to human action 
—thus they postulate the existence of 'eco-
nomic man', 'political man', and so on— which 
may not be valid or acceptable, and must 
therefore be analysed by this general theory 
of action or analytical sociology. 
In Medina's view, this sociological per-
spective offers an important point of departure 
for understanding of the social world, but does 
not exhaust the role that sociology can play, 
since it is not capable of overcoming all the 
shortcomings of the partial viewpoints of the 
individual social sciences. These sciences 
"work with their backs turned to the situation 
as a whole, on the basis of artificial construc-
tions imposed by their fragmentary point of 
view".47 The 'special' actions which they study 
imply abstractions in a dual sense; on the one 
4&ibid., p. 93. 
47Ibid., p. 96. 
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hand, there is a single answer of the actions 
who, although he pursues different purposes, 
is an indivisible 'person'; on the other, what-
ever the special purpose of the action, the 
overall structure in which it is carried out has 
a decisive influence on it. For this reason, in 
order to understand a social action it is neces-
sary to know the relationship it has with other 
actions and with the whole —person, institu-
tion, group and social structure—within which 
it is included. A discipline is required, there-
fore, which succeeds in achieving a perspec-
tive of the whole, which studies society as a 
whole, and which does not claim to expel or 
replace the other social sciences, but makes 
use of them: this is concrete sociology. 
To use the terminology which Albert O. 
Hirschman popularized with another theoret-
ical aim in view, the sociological perspectives 
which Medina suggests have 'forward' and 
'backward' linkages with the other social 
sciences, since on the basis of the materials 
which the latter provide, they help then to 
revise their assumptions and achieve a synthe-
sis of their findings. The sociological view is 
always a cross-section, since it penetrates 
through the other social sciences and brings 
them lines of contact at the base and the peak 
of their theoretical constructs. 
Sociology needs both the analytical and 
the concrete perspective, but the latter is 'its 
only raison d'être'. Medina underlines that 
this concreteness was imposed on sociology 
at its origins by Comte. For Comte social reality 
is a whole —a set of interdependent parts 
which cannot be understood in isolation, but 
only in the totality of their mutual relations— 
that has a historical nature which must be 
respected in the theoretical perspective with 
which it is tackled. 
2. In the Lecciones de sociología he prepared 
in Puerto Rico, Medina presents his analytical 
sociological theory, made up of a set of general 
and systematic concepts. 
After his long preoccupation with social 
action it does not seem strange that he should 
construct his analytical sociology on the basis 
of it, since he regards it as the "irreducible 
unit" of social reality. As a result, on the basis 
of social action and following the main thrust 
of the Weberian orientation, Medina puts in 
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place the fundamental parts of a theoretical 
edifice the culmination of which highlights 
the concept of social structure. In this way, 
between the tiny individual social action and 
the overall structure of society are found all 
the concepts which, interwined, make up his 
analytical sociology. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued with 
justification that he might well have chosen the 
reverse route, and begun his analysis on the 
basis of the concept of social structure, so as to 
highlight conceptually the predominance of 
structural over analytical sociology. However, 
either from pedagogical necessity, or because 
he wished to follow the example of his teachers 
M. Weber and G. Simmel, or because he was 
dazzled by the architectural elegance of his 
constructs, he did not begin with the whole, 
but with the most elementary unit and, further-
more, spent much time on analyses which are 
very suggestive, but also rather formal and 
abstract, in the best style of the second of 
the teachers mentioned. 
At all events, compared with previous 
examples his exposition is more rigorous and 
systematic, and it is possible to draw from it, 
without major difficulties, the fundamental 
concepts with which he formulates his so-
ciological theory and whose understanding is 
undoubtedly indispensable in order to tackle 
his sociology of development. 
After defining social action, like Weber, 
as that action whose meaning is related to the 
action of others, he distinguishes within it 
two basic components: the actor or person who 
carries out the action, and the social situation 
in which it is carried out. 
There are only two types of actors or units 
of action, individuals and groups. Individuals 
are by their very nature subjects of action, since 
they alone possess corporeal reality, awareness 
and will, but groups also have a specific reality, 
which can be grasped empirically. This reality 
of the groups derives from the fact that they 
are collective units of action which carry out 
in an articulated, organized manner activities 
that cannot be carried out by individual action. 
The actions carried out by these individual 
and collective units are usually not chaotic 
and disordered but, on the contrary, are charac-
terized by their uniform and continuous repeti-
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tion over time. This characteristic of social 
actions derives from the circumstance that the 
actors conform to a greater or lesser extent to 
behaviour patterns which they find already 
formed in their society. In his social situa-
tion the actor encounters normative orienta-
tions which indicate to him both what he 
should do (purpose of the action) and how he 
should do it (technical orientation of the ac-
tion); conformity expresses acceptance of and 
compliance with the normative orientations 
of the social 'models' of action, and is in turn 
the basis for the social cohesion which is 
manifested in the fact that all actors share in 
the common meanings, ends and values, and 
in the force of the links which unite them. 
The fact of conformity is central in the 
sociological perspective, since it is the prin-
cipal link between the actor and his situation, 
and its influence is so profound that not only 
is man moulded by society, but in most cases 
freely accepts such moulding. 
The conformity of the actors with their 
normative orientations is produced by two 
fundamental factors. Firstly, by social pres-
sure, which like atmospheric pressure is 
imperceptible, widespread, constant; its con-
tribution is culture, and its constituent ele-
ments the mentefacts, artefacts and socio-
facts already mentioned. Secondly, by social 
control, which is perceptible, specific, delib-
erate; it requires organs and instruments for 
its application, and its support is power. 
The normative orientations which mould 
the activity of the individual and collective 
units of action together form a sort of overall 
normative order, but are also, at a more limited 
level, grouped into two 'units for normative 
co-ordination of action': the roles and institu-
tions which give the normative orientations a 
specific shape. 
The roles are sets of normative orienta-
tions which refer to a social activity or posi-
tion and therefore determine a given series of 
rights and obligations. The institutions are 
units of co-ordination which shape large areas 
of activity; they are not units of action, as is 
sometimes thought, but the units of action act 
within their framework, in conformity with 
their 'institutional patterns' (economic, politi-
cal, educational, and so on). The concept of a 
role is of central importance in this perspective, 
because not only are the institutions sets of 
organized roles for the achievement of a given 
collective purpose, but in addition these 
constitute the basis of the notion of a person, 
i.e., the individual conceived as the support 
for a set of social roles. 
So far all the concepts highlight the in-
fluence of the normative orientations on be-
haviour; Medina holds that this is the typical 
sociological perspective, theoretically very 
fruitful but also very incomplete. Of central 
importance for his perspective is the idea that 
social phenomena are strained by opposing 
trends, are subject to 'polarities' which cannot 
be resolved dialectically but may at best reach 
a balance among themselves. It is the already 
mentioned interaction between action and 
situation. Both trends are always necessary; 
without conformity societies dissolve, but 
without nonconformity there is no develop-
ment or creation. The same occurs with the 
tendencies present in any individual: the 
'moulded ego' adapts and conforms to the 
prevailing order and is a reflection of its situa-
tion, while the 'innermost ego' rebels, inno-
vates, creates. On the level of the relationship 
between units of action and co-ordination, 
therefore, there exists a dual trend towards 
conformity and rebellion which is one of the 
nuclei of Medina's theory. 
He adopts a similar position when he 
analyses some of the basic social relations 
between the actors. As a backdrop to all the 
most concrete social relations and an irreduc-
ible component of any form of coexistence 
stand concord and discord, which emerge as 
an expression of the human passions and 
demand the formulation of a sociology of 
affective life. At a more concrete level he 
sketches, in often brilliant pages, some opposi-
tions which are manifested in classical social 
relations: contact and isolation, competition 
and co-operation, authority and obedience, 
differences between types of status and be-
tween the social strata. 
These social relations represent the social 
fabric, the threads with which men weave and 
unravel it, because the 'brilliant tapestry' of 
the historical process always shows on its 
reverse side the humble and patient fabric of 
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everyday actions, and they may be viewed 
from a dual perspective: as 'processes' which 
unfold over t ime, or as 'structures' which are 
the consolidated result of this unfolding at a 
given moment. 
I t has already been said that Medina, for 
various reasons, notably the attraction exerted 
by the elegance of strict concept and architec-
ture —as happens to many economists with neo-
classical thinking— analyses and appraises the 
contribution of the interactionist school which 
concentrates on the analysis of social relations 
at the interpersonal level. But he points out that 
sociological theory cannot stop there and must 
turn to the study of the collective units of action 
and the institutions, for only through them can 
the social structure be observed. On the one 
hand, he asserts that the "physiognomy of a 
given society depends on the character of its 
predominant , axial groups";48 the internal 
organization of these groups —their values, 
norms, means, distribution of functions and 
roles— and their relationships are an essential 
component of the social structure. On the other, 
the institutions constitute the broader 'struc-
tural setting' of any society. It is true that this 
institutional perspective should be used with 
caution, since it can lead to a very general and 
abstract approach or to a mistaken reification 
of the institutions —problems which functional-
ism has often not been able to overcome— 
but it also possesses major virtues because of 
its structural nature. 
In his subsequent studies on the sociology 
of development Medina was to examine more 
thoroughly both the groups and the social roles 
specific to the economic institutions and, in 
particular, was to explore the relations between 
the economic institutions and political and 
educational institutions. 
Finally, there is a last aspect of his analytic 
sociology which should be highlighted be-
cause of its influence on his sociology of 
development . It has already been mentioned 
that, for him, social actions usually include a 
dual orientation concerning both the purpose 
of the action and the way in which it is carried 
Lecciones de sociología, typed version referred to 
above, p. 134. 
out. In this latter orientation one may distin-
guish some classical types, such as rational 
action and traditional action, which can be the 
foundation for different types of conformity and 
therefore of different types of cohesion and 
social structure. 
When instrumental rational action predo-
minates, where appropriate, means are applied 
to achieve a previously chosen end in the most 
efficient way, this gives rise to cohesion based 
on consensual agreement, on the interrelation-
ship of interests, which generates a social 
structure made u p of a fabric of instrumental 
actions where the segmentary interests of its 
members are grouped and related. 
When traditional action predominates an 
activity is reproduced without selection of 
means or ends, which does not seek to gain a 
benefit or satisfy an interest but merely to 
' repeat a custom' or 'maintain a tradition'. 
Traditional cohesion is based on custom, soli-
darity and emotion, and the predominant rela-
tionships in the social structure are of the 
gemeinschaft type. 
Concerning these types of articulation of 
human activities —which range from the inter-
personal social relationship to the overall struc-
ture of society— two approaches have arisen, 
both of singular importance in the sociology of 
development . On the one hand, there is a 
formal and unhistorical approach which ana-
lyses the nature of any social fact on the basis of 
these types and, on the other, a historical 
approach which conceives the two types as 
successive phases in a transition from the 
'gemeinschaft' to the 'gesellschaft' society or, 
as Medina was to put it later, from the tradition-
al to the industrial structure. 
3. In his Lecciones de sociología Medina 
accordingly constructs the complex analytical 
edifice which is founded on social action and 
culminates in the social structure. This socio-
logical approach is an indispensable means of 
studying any society, since it provides the 
'framework of concepts ' which makes it pos-
sible to 'grasp reality'. "For while the concepts 
are never the reality —which goes far beyond 
them in its richness— reality would escape us if 
we did not possess them."49 
49
"Proyecto de un curso", in Presentaciones y Plan-
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Nevertheless, it is worth repeating that, in 
Medina's view, the analytical perspective is 
insufficient to satisfy the aspiration of sociolo-
gy, even when the preeminence of the struc-
tural approach over the interpersonal approach 
is emphasized. Sociology has the duty of 
providing guidance for human action, and for 
that purpose it must be not only structural but 
also concrete, historical. The general concepts 
of analytical sociology must be the foundation 
for the typological and individual concepts of 
concrete sociology, since the formers, left to 
their own devices, are empty and formal, mere 
elements in an abstract sociology which is no 
use in providing guidance. 
It has already been mentioned that the 
typed version of Medina's Lecciones includes 
only his analytical sociology, and even then 
incompletely, but in his inaugural exposition in 
the general social science course in Puerto Rico 
—which appears in "Proyecto de un curso" — 
he clearly outlines the general framework 
within which it falls, the purpose which guides 
it and the various parts which go to make it up. 
The basic purpose is to encourage the students 
to be aware of the world in which they live, to 
understand the reality which surrounds them 
and the causes of it, and to make this awareness 
the point of departure for the development of 
their personalities. 
In order to achieve this aim he divides the 
general social science course into three parts. 
The first is devoted to analytical sociology, as 
has already been outlined, which in this case 
he calls 'theory of society'. In the second part 
he sketches the type of historical society 'in 
which we are immersed' and which he calls 
'liberal society'. In this outline he presents 
"what has been and remains that organization, 
that way of seeing and living life, ...how such a 
type of society arose and what has been its 
growth, what thinking shaped it or expresses it, 
how and in what form it then enters into the 
situation of change in which it now appears to 
be".50 In the third part, "contemporary socie-
ty", he analyses "the social forms which are our 
personal experience", thoroughly examines 
the "crisis of our time", highlights the most 
important current changes in the political, 
economic, educational and international fields, 
and explores the probable trends in their 
orientation. 
Here the sociology proposed by Medina 
and the meaning and function of its different 
parts are outiined clearly. The analytical ap-
proach, with its vigour and architectural ele-
gance, is the appropriate instrument to analyse 
the general social phenomena and constitutes 
the point of entry to concrete sociology which 
transforms the concepts of the former in order 
to bring them closer to reality and permit 
historical understanding of the origins, present 
status and trends of current societies, which 
make up the "social situation" of modern man. 
I l l 
The foundations of the sociology of development 
Medina's writings can be divided into two 
stages, the dividing point between them being 
his joining CEPAL at the beginning of the 
1950s. In the first stage, set out in the previous 
chapters, he outlines the perspective of sociol-
ogy and established it as a rigorous science; 
in the second he lays down the foundations of 
teos. Papeles de Sociología (Mexico City, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional, 
1953), p. 224. 
the sociology of development and analyses 
some of its fundamental themes. 
It is necessary to ask whether Medina is 
brought to the sociology of development as a 
consequence of the spontaneous evolution of 
his thinking —and regards CEPAL as a favour-
able environment to develop it in— or whether, 
in contrast, his joining CEPAL, prompted by 
mlbid., p. 225. 
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other reasons, is a fact which influences and 
guides his intellectual activity towards the 
sociological problems of development. It is 
very likely that Medina thought CEPAL could 
offer him a safe haven, a legal and economic 
umbrella which would free him and his family 
from the sometimes very abrupt changes in 
Latin American history. The insecurity of his 
status as an exile and the prospect of a wander-
ing life must have been fundamental reasons 
for his decision to join a United Nations 
organization. Of course the CEPAL of that time 
was not just any common or garden internatio-
nal organization, but one in which original 
economic thinking was being created through 
intensive debate: for Medina this feature must 
have been an additional, although not decisive, 
attraction.51 
CEPAL's interest in economic develop-
ment and Medina's vocation for sociology 
helped him to create the hybrid field of the 
sociology of development. However, this was 
not a new preoccupation, since in some pre-
CEPAL essays —particularly "Economía y 
sociología", written in 1941— his interest in 
the subject is already clear. Moreover, there are 
others which also attract him, and probably, if 
his intellectual haven had been other than 
CEPAL, they might have warranted his later 
attention: thus, the epistemology of the social 
sciences and the sociology of culture and of art, 
among others, emerged strongly in his early 
writings, and he was to refer to them subse-
quently with a certain nostalgia. 
At all events, above and beyond the 
reasons which prompted him to join CEPAL 
and the slant CEPAL introduced in his think-
ing, the two stages of his thinking are highly 
compatible, since the first is characterized by 
the subjects involved in the foundation of 
sociology in general, and the second by the 
5 1 T h e cold war and Macarthyism may perhaps have 
increased the uncertainty of his personal circumstances, 
bu t the fact is that Medina, despite his brilliant background 
as a social scientist, joined CEPAL in August 1952 as an 
editor —in other words, to improve the style of what the 
economists wrote— and remained in that position for some 
years before be ing accepted as a sociologist. This fact may 
at least serve as some consolation to all the sociologists who 
survive thanks to the self-sacrificing work done to improve 
the language of others. 
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construction of the special edifice of the soci-
ology of development on those foundations. 
This compatibility means that we can be 
certain that even if Medina had not followed 
when he did the intellectual path of his first 
stage, he would have found himself obliged to 
do so later, when in CEPAL he was faced with 
the imperative of creating a sociological per-
spective on development. 
The beginning of economic sociology 
1. When Medina, in CEPAL, comes up against 
the need to grasp economic development con-
ceptually, he does so —and he could not have 
done so otherwise— using the categories of 
thought which he had been outlining during 
the previous 20 years. Economic development 
is undoubtedly a 'social fact', but what are its 
particular characteristics? 
Firstly, does it belong only to the sphere 
of economics, or has it a broader range which 
extends to other areas of social reality? Eco-
nomic development is largely an economic 
phenomenon! —he was even to claim, in the 
middle of the 1960s, that its 'essential mecha-
nism' is economic— but its significance goes 
beyond those limits. Economic development is 
a "phenomenon of social change" in which 
what changes is "a social structure in its 
totality, along an identifiable line between two 
precise moments",52 i.e., it is a 'total', 'inte-
grated' phenomenon. This 'total' nature of 
development, which Medina underlines from 
his first writings in CEPAL, appears to derive 
from two assumptions, one historical and the 
other theoretical. On the one hand, economic 
development is a piece of the "general process 
of rationalization", a consequence of the "civi-
lizing process" in which technical power and 
scientific knowledge converge, as he often 
said, using the concepts coined by A. Weber. 
Because of the force of this general process of 
rationalization, "a universal tendency in our 
times", history is moving in a specific direc-
tion: towards the formation of industrial socie-
5 2
"Las condiciones sociales del desarrollo económico" 
(1955), in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económico, op. 
cit., p . 5 1 . 
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ty.53 Because of its total character, this process 
encompasses and imbues the whole society, 
including the economic process. On the other 
hand, there is a theoretical assumption that also 
lays the basis for this total nature of develop-
ment: society is a 'system'. "Society is never a 
mere agglomeration of actions and processes, 
but tends to be or to become a system, although 
it perhaps never succeeds in achieving this 
completely." As a result, "from whatever as-
pect one begins to examine human life —pro-
vided that one does not dally arbitrarily— 
one is certain of returning once again to the 
same place after having described a full 
circle".54 In short, not only do the historical 
roots of economic development make it neces-
sary to regard it as a total phenomenon, but also, 
like any other social phenomenon, when pene-
trating into a society which is in itself a 
'system', it requires 'conditions' and produces 
'consequences' which go beyond the economic 
sphere. The formation of industrial society 
involves processes of very varied kinds, and as 
a result "only in analytical abstraction is it 
possible to speak of economic development as 
an independent phenomenon; in reality this 
process unfolds interlinked with another of a 
social nature".55 
Secondly, Medina emphasizes that, al-
though development is a real trend in the 
historical process, it is also an objective ex-
pressly pursued by the social actors. It is at the 
same time a real tendency which influences 
and defines the concrete situation of the social 
actors and an aspiration which shapes the 
objectives they set themselves; it is reality and 
aspiration, historical tendency and normative 
model. For this reason, there are both one and 
many paths of development, since various 
possible courses exist, in the selection of which 
there is a margin of choice, of freedom. Eco-
nomic development has its inescapable imper-
^ " E l papel del sociólogo en las tareas del desarrollo 
económico" (1958), in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo 
económico, op. cit., p. 15. 
^"Tres aspectos sociológicos del desarrollo económi-
co" (1955), in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económico, 
op. cit., p. 70. 
^ " E l papel del sociólogo en las tareas del desarrollo 
económico", in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económi-
co, op. cit., p- 21. 
atives, but these may be compiled with in very 
varied ways and at very varied speeds, and 
choice between them requires a substantial 
amount of human decision; as in individual 
action, development combines necessity and 
freedom. In Medina's view, economic devel-
opment, qua social change, always passes via 
man's consciousness, since any social change is 
historically and ethically attributable to human 
decision and responsibility. In making this 
formulation, he also returns time and again to 
A. Weber's historical view that peoples with 
their orientations, which constitute the 'culture 
process', respond to the challenge of their 'vital 
aggregates' made up of the combination of the 
'civilizing' and 'social' processes. These vital 
aggregates constitute the reality which is avail-
able to be moulded as far as possible to human 
aspirations and, in their response to it, men and 
peoples always necessarily manifest "a pos-
sibility of preference and choice, of creation 
and freedom".56 
These two features enable him to define, 
in general, the role that falls to the sociologist. 
If development is a total phenomenon, its 
student must take into consideration social 
realities as a whole and highlight the interdis-
ciplinary nature of development, as an object of 
analysis. This Medina does from the outset of 
his interest in the subject, but what is the role 
that falls to the different social sciences? He 
finds the answer to this question in his pre-
CEPAL studies on the manner of tackling 
social reality: to respect the approaches of the 
individual disciplines and make use of their 
results, especially thdse of economics, but 
always to remember their limitations, and 
accordingly the need to complement them with 
the sociological point of view, both analytical 
and concrete. 
Moreover, if development is both a real 
tendency and a social objective, the sociologist 
must leave aside the technical attitude prompt-
ed in him by the scientific principle of'neutral-
ity in values' and adopt a critical posture. Since 
"this element of freedom is inescapable, the 
sociologist cannot avoid participating at the 
time of outlining preferences and decisions. 
56Ibid., p. 27. 
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On the contrary, he is obliged to co-operate 
critically in making them with maximum pos-
sible clarity and responsibility.57 
Medina maintains this initial conception of 
-development and the role which falls to sociol-
ogy and sociologists within it in many later 
writings. For example, he returns to the theme 
of the sociological approaches to development 
in 1963 and divides them into two types: those 
stimulated by praxis and those required by 
knowledge. 
A good example of the first type is social 
policy, whether it is conceived as 'social as-
sistance', which endeavours to improve living 
conditions, or as, 'human investment' which 
aims at developing and improving those social 
aspects which, like education, can have a 
decisive effect on economic growth. Medina 
respects these perspectives, but not only gives 
them little support with his personal work, but 
believes that they may lead to erroneous 
approaches. In particular, they may lead to 
the social aspects being regarded as epiphe-
nomena or residual of the economic aspects, 
and to social objectives being subordinated to 
economic objectives forgetting that the former 
are independent, respond to "what are regard-
ed as permanent, paramount values" and "are 
related, not so much to development itself—a 
neutral and intermediary mechanism— as to 
the kind of society to which development 
aspires or which it is intended to produce".58 
The viewpoints demanded by knowledge 
do not refer to social problems or human invest-
ment but endeavour to interpret the economic 
process in relation to the overall social struc-
ture of which it is part, and they take the form of 
two variants, analytical and historical, in line 
with what has already been said concerning 
Medina's sociological view. 
2. His first outline of economic sociology, 
carried out at the beginning of the 1940s, is 
devoted to a study of the relationship between 
economics and analytical sociology.59 In it, he 
57Ibid., p. 28. 
^"Economic development in Latin America —socio-
logical considerations", CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, 
mimeographed, p. 5. 
59
"Economía y Sociología" (1941), in Responsabilidad 
de la Inteligencia, op. cit., 1943. 
reviews the different ways in which the rela-
tionship between the two disciplines at the 
analytical level has been conceived and out-
lines a general position on the problem which, 
with some variations, he will maintain later in 
his CEPAL writings. One may infer from his 
structural conception of society that it is neces-
sary to achieve the broadest possible analytical 
perspective, and accordingly that interdisci-
plinary efforts must be stimulated. For this 
reason, he begins by rejecting the typical 
posture of neoclassical thinking in economics, 
which keeps its distance from sociology, citing 
the defects which that discipline is alleged to 
suffer from, such as the vagueness of its 
propositions, the preference for imprecise or 
disproportionate objects of analysis, internal 
disagreement concerning theoretical perspec-
tives and interpretation of results, and inap-
propriate use of the scientific method. Medina 
feels that this is a mistaken position, and the 
neoclassical criticism, which might apply with 
some reason to the encyclopaedic sociology of 
the last century, does not do justice to present-
day sociology; those who now persist in such 
criticism "are not so much manifesting their 
scientific antipathies as defending their own 
brand of sociology, in other words, the sociolo-
gy which is implicit in, and a necessary as-
sumption of, a particular economic system".60 
As is well-known, other schools of eco-
nomic thought have emerged to overcom'e this 
short-sightedness in the neoclassical approach, 
such as the German historical school, which 
emphasizes the transitory and historical nature 
of the alleged universal 'laws' of economics 
—which would always have to belong to a 
concrete society— and North American insti-
tutionalism, which opposes the excessively 
abstract nature of neoclassical thinking and 
underlines the need for a realistic interpreta-
tion of economic life. 
Medina believes that the schools of 
thoughts are correct up to a point, but empha-
sizes that they in turn commit a basic error 
since they dissolve economic theory in philoso-
phy, history or sociology to the point of causing 
it to disappear, but at the same time are 
mlbid., p. 100. 
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incapable of themselves formulating a new and 
rigorous integrated theory to take the place of 
the conventional theory. For this reason he 
suggests that more fruitful paths should be 
sought in the area of the relationship between 
economics and sociology —paths which would 
broaden, improve and not dissolve the theory 
of the first with the perspective and findings of 
the second. 
T h e quest for this path is based on two 
profound convictions of Medina's which must 
be emphasized. The first is that social science 
must be first and foremost a science, and that 
this imperative imposes inescapable require-
ments . Although it may arise from concrete, 
and therefore particular problems, the scientif-
ic task makes it necessary to rise from them to 
more general and abstract concepts and rela-
tionships, towards those basic 'schematisms' 
which articulate any social reality. "Under the 
diversity of the concrete or historical structures 
of the different societies there are certain 
schematisms in the most elementary attitudes 
and relationships which ... constitute the fun-
damental assumption or foundation of all their 
manifestations [and] indicate the ultimate and 
decisive elements in a social structure, on 
whose existence or non-existence depends the 
possibility of specific concrete realizations."61 
To this first epistemological conviction 
Medina adds his belief that among the social 
sciences only economics has been able to 
achieve fruitful results at the analytical level, 
because its theoretical construction asserts 
itself over a small number of fundamental 
schematisms. It is true that these schematisms 
can in turn rest on unreal assumptions or give 
rise to theoretical constructions which are 
excessively closed in on themselves, but in 
Medina 's view these are not sufficient grounds 
for rejecting them. Rather, their success should 
guide interdisciplinary analytical efforts. "In 
the study of economic development as an 
overall phenomenon, the decisive and central 
role which falls to the economist in this 'inter-
disciplinary' co-operation is readily recognized 
by all as something obvious. It is the economist 
6 1
"Las condiciones sociales del desarrollo económi-
co", in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económico, op. cit., 
p . 51 . 
who must lay down in principle the guidelines 
for the research, indicating the problematical 
questions he considers most important and 
suggesting the tasks which he deems comple-
mentary to his own work."62 
The greater analytical achievements of 
economics compared with sociology lie, as has 
already been said, in the better adaptation of its 
object of analysis to scientific treatment, but 
the greater scientific status of economics, what-
ever the reason for it, justifies both its pre-
eminence and the subordination it imposes on 
sociology in this interdisciplinary relationship. 
Scientific reason, and not the possible meaning 
of its objects, is for Medina the basis for 
leadership in the common task. If sociology 
enters into the analytical stronghold of eco-
nomics the most likely result will be negative, 
since all that it will achieve will be to pull 
economics down to its own scientific level; it 
would therefore be best for sociology to fulfil 
its task from the outside, reviewing and im-
proving the foundations —the assumptions— 
on which economics rests. 
However, as early as in "Economía y 
sociología", when evaluating some works by 
Parsons, he warns against the type of analysis 
which maintains a high level of abstraction and 
does not seek concrete historical assumptions. 
Parsons endeavours to complement con-
ventional economic theory with analytical so-
ciology, for which purpose he proceeds from 
the basis that, qua theories, both are inevitably 
analytical abstractions and not descriptions of 
concrete facts. Economic theory is oriented 
towards the analysis of economic action 
—which Parsons defines, in the style of Rob-
bins, as rational action, or that which seeks to 
achieve optimum solutions with given ends 
and scarce but alternative means — while poli-
tics is directed towards the analysis of political 
action and sociology towards the analysis of 
social action in general . If economic theory, the 
theory of rational action, does not stand up to 
empirical proof it must be complemented with 
other theories of non-rational action, especially 
political, and with the general theory of action 
supplied by sociology. In this way they all 
mIbid., p. 48. 
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remain autonomous and complement one 
another. 
Medina endorses Parsons' attempt to avoid 
the merging of sociology and economic theory, 
but believes that it will not be successful if it 
remains at the level of high analytical abstrac-
tion. "The social sciences are not purely and 
exclusively analytical constructions, but above 
all concrete sciences".63 The principles of 
economic analysis and analytical sociology will 
be useful only when they make it possible to 
gain knowledge of concrete reality and to find 
one's way in it; between these principles and 
reality there is a gap which can only be 
overcome tty means of the 'principia media' 
which express the concrete operation of the 
general principles of the 'structural conditions' 
in which they operate. The sociological as-
sumptions of economic theory —as conceived 
by A. Lowe, changing with the changes in 
reality— are those 'principia media' demanded 
by Medina. 
As is obvious, in his analysis of the rela-
tionship between economics and analytical 
sociology Medina re-emphasizes the need for a 
theory which provides the fundamental con-
cepts and principles, but stresses —as he had 
already done in his criticism of Simmel— that if 
it remains at this level the theory runs the risk 
of "sliding over reality". Hence the need for 
the 'principa media' which make these general 
concepts and principles specific in given his-
torical societies. It is this concrete analysis, the 
ultimate raison d'être of sociology and the basis 
of its nature as 'knowledge providing guid-
ance', which serves as a complement for eco-
nomic theory by revising the inevitable socio-
logical assumptions on which it is founded. 
This was, of course, the suggestion by A. Lowe 
which had so much influence on Medina. 
According to Lowe, sociology should explore 
the concrete social assumptions of economic 
theory which, although usually implicit, are 
basic components of it. Conventional economic 
theory was realistic while its sociological as-
sumptions corresponded to reality, and will be 
so again when they are again consistent with 
the social conditions which actually exist; and 
^"Economía y sociología" in Responsabilidad de la 
inteligencia..., op. cit., p. 118. 
in this task of bringing economic theory closer 
to reality sociology can provide considerable 
assistance. 
Still dealing with the analytical approach, 
Medina analyses the ambitious attempts which 
have been made to incorporate sociological 
variables in existing economic theory.64 In 
other words, maintaining the nature of eco-
nomic theory as a 'model' —a 'quantified 
theory' or 'quantified set of hypotheses' which 
is expressed in causal or correlation relations— 
they endeavour to insert social variables in it. 
Medina holds that for the time being these 
attempts are doomed to fail because of the 
nature of the facts specific to sociology: its 
complexity, multiplicity and difficulties in 
quantification and measurement do not permit 
the precise establishment of relationships be-
tween the sociological variables, and between 
them and economic variables. The relation-
ships between the latter are 'functions' which 
make rigorous prediction and practical appli-
cation possible, but their different nature pre-
vents them from forming a common theory with 
sociological variables, unless economic theory 
is to lose in scientific rigour and practical 
applicability. 
However, these difficulties in rigorously 
establishing the interdependence between 
economic and sociological aspects have not 
discouraged sociologists,-, most of whom base 
their theories on some assumption about the 
interdependence which would seem to exist 
between the various types of human activity; 
we have already seen that Medina too makes an 
assumption of this kind, starting in his early 
works, in line with the Comtean theory of 
consensus. He knows that it is not possible to 
establish rigorous relations between economic 
and sociological variables, but he asserts that 
there is an important connexion between them. 
He refers to this connexion in different ways: 
sometimes he speaks of 'euninctional' rela-
64
 He sets out these ideas in "El papel del sociólogo en 
las tareas del desarrollo económico" (1958), in Aspectos 
sociales del desarrollo económico, op. cit., pp. 18-19, and in 
"Relationship between social and economic institutions: A 
theoretical model applicable to Latin America", Economie 
Bulletin for Latin America., Vol. VI, N.° 1 (March 1961), 
pp. 27-39. 
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tions, using the strictest structural-functionalist 
terminology; at other times he uses the Webe-
rian concept of "consistency"; and, finally, 
prompted by aesthetic zeal, he uses, likes Goe-
the, the idea of "elective affinities". 
This type of relationship can prove in-
adequate but "within its limits ... it enables 
diagnosis to steer a fairly accurate course, in 
complex historical situations, between the two 
extremes of exaggerated faith in the value of 
absolute prediction —scientific and quantifi-
able^— and the discouragement provoked by 
mere groping in the dark".65 
The social conditions of economic 
development 
1. It is clear from the preceding pages that for 
Medina the attempts to link economics and 
sociology at the analytical level have led to 
various theoretical impasses. Those who have 
sought to unite them in a complicated way by 
creating an integrated scheme of interpretation 
have come up against the problem of the 
differences between economic and social phe-
nomena and, at the same time, the different 
theoretical treatments which they permit; the 
merging of analytical economics in history or in 
sociology and the frustrated incorporation of 
sociological variables in economic models are 
examples of the poor results achieved by 
following these incorrect paths. 
Sociology should work 'from outside" the 
theoretical schemes of analytical economics 
and not seek to penetrate into them. Despite 
this limitation, its task of supplementation can 
be most valuable: i.e., to assist in critically 
refining the economic 'model' by indicating its 
partial and abstract nature and avoiding the 
fallacy of inappropriate concretion; to prevent 
the economic 'bottlenecks' caused by insuf-
ficient or poorly adjusted social factors and the 
social consequences of the application of the 
economic models; and, above all, to uncover 
the social assumptions or conditions on which 
these models are based. It is this last type of 
interdisciplinary co-operation between eco-
nomics and sociology which Medina pro-
6 5
 "Relationship between social and economic institu-
tions...", op. cit., p . 32. 
pounds with greatest emphasis, but he also 
warns against merely analytical treatment of 
these social assumptions: once it has reached 
this point, analytical sociology should prompt-
ly yield to concrete sociology, for only the latter 
will be capable of linking the economic models 
with the historical reality which gave rise to 
them and makes them meaningful. 
It should be no surprise, therefore, that 
Medina's first essay in CEPAL is entitled 'The 
social conditions of economic development'. 
In it he sets out a preliminary programme for 
the study of this topic containing all the aspects 
which, in his view, sociology can tackle in 
relation to development.66 If no account is 
taken of the order in which the subjects are 
presented (which must have been a result of 
circumstantial, factors), and if they are analysed 
in detail, it will be observed that behind them 
appears an interpretative scheme which de-
rives from his basic sociological categories. 
In principle, development is a historical 
tendency which causes transformations 
throughout society and, as such, must be anal-
ysed from the analytical and concrete points 
of view. The former deals with the fundamental 
schematisms which underlie the whole social 
structure —and which Medina believes can be 
grasped using Parsons' "pattern variables"— 
while the latter incorporates the contribution 
of history; with the contributions of both view-
points 'analytical typologies' could be con-
structed which would make it possible to out-
line the orientation of that historical tendency 
and the situation of the Latin American coun-
tries in relation to i t 
However, as has already been said, devel-
opment is also a social objective, and accord-
^ M e d i n a gives these social aspects various names. 
The definition most in accordance with his ideas appears to 
b e that which reserves the terms 'social aspects' and 'social 
factors' for the most general characterization; 'social 
assumptions' for the external, but indispensable, socio-
logical aspects of an economic theory; 'social conditions' 
for the aspects which refer to a historical interpretation of a 
real process; and, finally, 'social obstacles' for the social 
aspects which hamper the achievement of certain planned 
economic objectives or, in Medina's explicit terms, the 
"social bottlenecks which prevent ... the normal and 
unhindered flow of the desired economic process". See 
"Tres aspectos sociológicos del desarrollo económico", in 
Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económico, op. cit., p. 71. 
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ingly it is necessary to ascertain 'what is 
wanted ' , with all the ideological connotations 
of the subject, the manner and the means to be 
used and the social groups which will attempt 
it. 
The studies linked to development as a 
tendency and as an objective, or to put it 
another way, the analytical, historical and 
normative approaches implied in them, intro-
duce some of the problems which were of 
greatest interest to Medina, especially, as will 
be seen below, in relation to the 'Weberian 
paradigm'. Using them as a basis, he defines 
the 'model ' of development which will serve 
as a 'normative orientation' of action by the 
social actors. 
Once the 'model ' of development has 
b e e n defined as a real tendency and a social 
objective, it is necessary to analyse the social 
actors who, in a wide variety of spheres of 
action, must behave in a manner appropriate 
to it. On the one hand, it is necessary to study 
the actors themselves —their characteristics, 
behaviour, motivations and so on— whether 
they are public or private managers, workers, 
politicians, bureaucrats, technicians, intellec-
tuals and so on. On the other, it is necessary to 
analyse the spheres of activity in which these 
actors operate, such as enterprises, the State, 
scientific, technie^' and educational institu-
tions, t rade unions, political parties and move-
ments , and so on, in addition to the relation-
ships be tween them. 
Finally, the actors and the spheres of 
activity exist and operate amidst material, cul-
tural and social conditions which Medina also 
includes in his list; among the latter he high-
lights some 'concrete social structures' such as 
social stratification, the family, agrarian and 
urban structures, and population. 
2. When Medina endeavours to define the 
model of development, both from an analytical 
and from a historical and normative point of 
view, and its social conditions, he enters into a 
dialogue with M. Weber since, in his opinion, 
the most profound analyses in this field were 
formulated by Weber when he inquired into 
the social assumptions of liberal economics or 
the social conditions of formal economic ra-
tionality. 
In seeking guidance in this complex sub-
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ject, he says, one calls either on the historian 
or on the theoretician. In other words, the 
questions are asked in the concrete terms of the 
historian or the abstract terms of the theoreti-
cian, both equally relevant and important. For 
the former, the fundamental question refers to 
the historical role played by concrete social 
conditions in economic development, while 
the second focuses on the link between socio-
logical assumptions and economic theory. 
According to Medina, Weber supplies the 
best formulation both of the ideal historical 
type of the origin and formation of the Western 
developed economies and of the theoretical 
model or paradigm of the 'liberal capitalist' 
structure of a society. In his historical interpre-
tation Weber holds, in general terms, that as 
economic development is a manifestation of 
the overall process of rationalization of West-
ern culture, its cultural or spiritual nucleus has 
been 'economic rationality' and, accordingly, 
attention should focus on the conditions which 
have made possible the emergence, develop-
ment, functioning and maintenance of that 
rationality. In this rational orientation of eco-
nomic action and in the conditions which made 
its continued predominance possible lies the 
historical root of liberal capitalism. These 
conditions, in turn, are the social assumptions 
of the theoretical model of the liberal structure, 
notably the free market, full competition, the 
complete appropriation by the enterprise of the 
physical means of production, freedom of con-
tract in labour relations and the 'laissez faire' 
State. 
A fundamental proposition clearly e-
merges from the Weberian thesis: economic 
development is based on the deployment of 
formal economic rationality, which is what is 
achieved in the economic relations established 
within the liberal social structure. This eco-
nomic development is 'liberal capitalist' eco-
nomic development, and the conditions for the 
establishment of a liberal social structure are 
requirements for the achievement of economic 
development and social assumptions of the 
economic theory. 
Medina rightly terms Weber's proposition 
' the Weberian paradigm', because not only is 
it a historical interpretation of the emergence 
of capitalism and an analytical theory of the 
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basic e lements which constitute the liberal 
social structure, but it also provides, in the 
hands of his epigones, the framework for the 
'model ' of society which should be constructed 
if it is wished to stimulate economic develop-
ment . In other words, it is at the same time a 
historical interpretation, an analytical theory 
and the foundation of a policy for the modern-
ization of society. 
In his early writings in CEPAL Medina 
temporarily accepts this proposition, perhaps 
because he was obliged to create in a short 
t ime —pressured by the 'resentful impatience' 
of the economists— an economic sociology 
which would not only explain what economic 
theory could not explain, but would also make 
it possible to guide practical action.67 Its ap-
plication enables him to feel on safe ground 
because , in addition, this proposition served 
as a basis for the sociology of development 
which was being formulated in the major 
English-speaking academic centres; the work 
of T. Parsons and W. Moore was widely known, 
and the latter even wrote at the request of 
U N E S C O an essay on the social frame of 
reference of economic development which 
Medina often used in those writings. 
An example of Medina's acceptance of the 
Weber ian thesis can be seen in his analysis of 
the social conditions of economic develop-
men t in Bolivia. Using a list of social 'require-
ments ' , drawn up on the basis of the Weberian 
formulations of W. Moore, he carries out an 
interpretation of the 'obstacles' to economic 
development presented by the social structure 
in Bolivia. Property, working relationships, 
the market, the political order, the organization 
of production, public administration, scientific 
and technical education, are among the aspects 
on the basis of which he organizes his descrip-
tion and explanation of the social situation and 
the measures which can be worked out to 
modify them if they are to serve as a foundation 
67Years after his first writings in CEPAL he was to 
express regret for various of his initial lapses. The very 
term 'social aspects of economic development' was to 
seem of 'extreme ambiguity' to him, and he only justified 
it "as the literary recourse of a specialist wishing to col-
laborate harmoniously with other scientists and entering 
at his own risk on admittedly foreign territory" (CEPAL 
document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 1). 
for economic development. All these social 
aspects should endeavour to reproduce the 
liberal model : for example, concerning the 
market he asserts that "the type of human rela-
tions and behaviour which make the function-
ing of a market possible constitute an inesca-
pable social assumption for any economic 
development".6 8 
3. However, from the outset Medina is aware 
of the limitations of the Weberian paradigm, if 
it is taken as a normative model. Thus, in his 
first work in CEPAL he emphasizes that the 
technical, economic and social problems of 
development in Latin America "cannot be 
resolved by copying the past or by imitating 
the supposed real models offered by the more 
advanced countries".69 These models are usu-
ally only myths or academic crystallizations 
which do not exist in reality, and, as a result it 
is necessary to stimulate 'creative ingenuity' 
in the task of 'extending industrial civilization'; 
bu t as it must be an ingenuity linked to reality, 
much care is necessary when invoking history 
in search for the model of development. 
Subsequently, in his essay 'El papel del 
sociólogo en las tareas del desarrollo econó-
mico', written in 1958, Medina redirects his 
thinking on the basis of a critical evaluation of 
Weber 's thesis, in which he concludes that the 
thesis has been invalidated by history. This 
invalidation is the result of two processes, 
which Medina analyses in various of his works. 
On the one hand, the transformations which 
have occurred in the 'liberal capitalist' social 
structures of the developed countries have 
carried them away from the archetypal features 
proposed by the paradigm. Among other as-
pects, there has been a marked reduction in 
freedom and competition in the different mar-
kets and a substantial change in the relations 
be tween the State and the economy, and, as a 
result, the real societies which the underdevel-
oped countries have before them are very dif-
ferent from the theoretical models which they 
^ " E l problema social en el desarrollo económico de 
Bolivia" (1956), in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo econó-
mico, op. cit., p . 115. 
^ " L a s condiciones sociales del desarrollo económico" 
in Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económico, op. cit., p. 
36. 
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are urged to imitate. On the other, socialist 
societies have appeared, which, despite all the 
forecasts to the contrary, have found their own 
path towards the achievement of economic 
development based on economic processes 
and social assumptions which are different 
from those suggested by the 'liberal capitalist' 
model . 
Both processes have drastically reduced 
the scope of valid application of the Weberian 
paradigm, since from a historical, theoretical 
and practical model of all possible economic 
development , it has become limited to a theory 
relating to the origin and foundation of the 
original liberal capitalist structure; the expla-
nation refers to only one of the possible types 
of economic development, and not to all.70 
For this reason, the suggestion that in 
order to achieve development it is necessary 
to align the social structure with the dictates 
of this paradigm is "innocent enough if it were 
not so dangerous",71 and, Medina insists, the 
essential task of the sociology of development 
consists in constructing the desirable and pos-
sible ' new models ' of social structure consis-
tent with economic development. 
This reorientation of Medina's thinking, 
which starts from a critique of the Weberian 
paradigm, can be understood as a reassessment 
of the role played by material reason in relation 
to formal reason in economic development. 
Mention has already been made of the differ-
ences be tween these types of rationality when 
outlining Medina's propositions concerning 
the scientific and instrumental nature of the 
social sciences; the same problem now reap-
pears in relation to economic development. 
Weber suggests in this regard that the only 
possible development is based on the stimula-
tion of formal rational economic action which 
germinates and grows in the favourable condi-
tions of the economic and political institution-
ality of the liberal social structure, but Medina 
7 ( ,The 'Weberian paradigm' is a "social model of 
economic development which only corresponds to a very 
precise historical stage in that development". "El papel del 
sociólogo en las tareas del desarrollo económico", in 
Aspectos sociales del desarrollo económico, op. cit., p . 22. 
7 1
 "Relationship between social and economic institu-
tions...", op. cit., p . 30. 
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is convinced that history has shown other 
paths, through the 'reform' of capitalism and 
socialism, which are based on a combination 
of the two types of rationality different from 
that suggested by classical liberalism. Econom-
ic development thus conceived is not the 
indirect result of the achievement of the par-
ticular benefit by the rational economic agents, 
but —only or also— the planned result of a 
politico-economic rational action directly 
aimed at achieving it. 
In short, the 'historical invalidation' of the 
Weberian paradigm leads him away from un-
critical acceptance of the 'liberal capitalist' 
model of economic development and its social 
assumptions and enables him to glimpse new 
subjects within the sociology of development. 
In particular, he is guided towards the analysis 
of the 'essential mechanism' of economic de-
velopment and of the 'real models ' in which it 
is manifested, since these constitute the neces-
sary base for devising development strategies, 
with their specific social conditions, for the 
countries of Latin America. 
4. Even so, his critique of the Weberian 
paradigm does not imply a rejection of the 
more general matrix of this school of thought. 
Economic development continues to be con-
ceived by Medina as a specific manifestation 
of the overall process of rationalization and, as 
such, bases its vigour on certain orientations 
of the economic actions of the important actors 
which emerge, develop and predominate if 
they enjoy favourable conditions and the ap-
propriate economic and political institutional 
framework. 
Within this analytical scheme, Medina 
formulates a proposition which is very impor-
tant for his sociology of development: eco-
nomic development has an 'essential mecha-
nism' which can be operated in various ways 
—all of them variations which occur within 
the theoretical and historical space separating 
the extreme types of capitalism and social-
ism— and the most important 'social conditions 
of development ' are those required by this 
essential mechanism, plus those linked to the 
concrete forms adopted by the process. 
Medina details the nature of the essential 
mechanism of any economic development in 
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his essay "El desarrollo y su filosofía",72 fol-
lowing the lines of another Weberian, E. 
Heimann. Basically, he asserts that "economic 
development is a continuing process whose 
essential mechanism consists in the repeated 
application of the surplus for new investment, 
and which has as a result the equally constant 
expansion of the unit of production concerned 
... [ which] may of course be an entire, large 
society ..."73 
In the societies which existed before the 
modern era economic activities were regulated 
and guided by the aims of other institutions 
(political, religious, family, and so on), to which 
they were subordinated both as regards their 
aims and the manner of achieving them; they 
were "integrated economic systems" in Hei-
mann ' s terminology. The specific character-
istic of historical capitalism —and later of 
socialism— is the gradual loosening of the ties 
be tween economic activities and the other 
institutions and their slow channelling towards 
independence , first, and predominance, later. 
In its extreme ideal type this process culmi-
nates in the shaping of pure economic systems, 
which are those where the essential economic 
mechanism —generation and productive in-
ves tment of the surplus in order to expand 
wealth to the maximum— predominates over 
and subordinates every other aim existing in 
the society. Accepting the characteristic exag-
geration of any ideal type, what is important 
is to under l ine that all the developed industrial 
societies have had to pass through a stage 
where their operation is fairly similar to the 
pure economic systems, characterized by the 
predominance of the essential mechanism of 
economic development, although subsequent 
historical evolution and doctrinaire values 
have lessened the rigour of this predominance. 
This inevitable "economism" of any form 
of development is manifested in various ways 
historically and theoretically, although its typi-
cal forms are those specific to the capitalist 
and socialist social structures; in the essay just 
referred to Medina reviews them under the 
titles of "market economism" and "planning 
72In Filosofía, educación y desarrollo, op. cit. 
73Ibid., p. 12. 
economism". In addition, in the final part of 
"Economie development in Latin America 
— sociological considerations", after empha-
sizing that there is no single formula for devel-
opment, he analyses the different technico-
eeonomic, political and sociological options on 
the basis of which the concrete strategies can 
be articulated. 
We will return to all this in the next chapter 
when sketching Medina's thinking concerning 
the relationship between development and 
politics. For the moment it is merely necessary 
to repeat that it is on the basis of the 'essential 
mechanism' of any form of development that 
the most general and strategic factors of any 
economic process thus directed are structured. 
Even if analysis of the social aspects is 
l imited to those linked to the essential mecha-
nism of development, it is difficult to present 
a single list of them, since Medina uses various 
lists, with a different number of assumptions. 
For example, he reduces the dozen factors he 
uses in "El problema social en el desarrollo 
económico de Bolivia" (1956) to five in "Rela-
tionship between social and economic institu-
t ions" (1960) and to four in "El desarrollo y su 
filosofía" (1965). However, behind this vari-
ability there is a certain constancy in orienta-
tion which makes it possible to decide on the 
genuinely important factors. 
T h e first and fundamental factor is a sort 
of motivational syndrome which Medina usu-
ally calls 'general economic commitment', in 
which he includes both 'economic aspirations', 
l inked to the expansion of wealth and the 
improvement of living conditions, and a per-
sonal and collective sense of responsibility 
vis-à-vis the necessary and inevitable sacrifices 
implied by economic development. As is evi-
dent, this is an attitude consistent with the 
technico-economic mechanism of develop-
ment, and Medina always refers to it empha-
sizing the aspects of" responsibility, sacrifice 
and effort it brings with it. In the formation of 
this 'ascepticism' an important role may be 
played by the educational system, the mass 
media, the political and trade union organiza-
tions and the direct example of the behaviour 
of the leading groups; its importance cannot 
b e underest imated, since "the most urgent of 
the development problems of the least ad-
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vanced countries derive, or have in the past 
derived, from the need to create, shape or 
stimulate".74 European experience indicates 
that the formation of this attitude in the work-
ing masses has been a task lasting centuries, 
but often, in our countries, even the leading 
groups have not adopted it. In that regard, and 
pointing to a central problem in peripheral 
capitalism, he points out that " the first formula 
[capitalism] can b e attractive only if the ruling 
minority, which temporarily reaps the benefit 
of the efforts of the rest of the community, is 
the first to act with the proper sense of respon-
sibility: to put the matter in economic terms, 
profit must be the visible instrument of rapid 
capital formation and not the unethical means 
of ostentatious expenditure".7 5 
The second assumption refers to the prop-
er performance by the economic and political 
actors of the role which falls to them in devel-
opment. If development is an organized pro-
cess which requires the best energies of a 
people , the various economic and political 
functions fundamental for its success must be 
performed with skill, discipline and creativity. 
Skill refers in particular to the scientific and 
technical preparation required for the proper 
performance of the various functions, disci-
pl ine to observance of the standards which 
indicate what are the duties to be performed, 
and creativity to the innovative nature which 
must be imparted to the performance of many 
functions. In "Las condiciones sociales del 
desarrollo económico" Medina reviews vari-
ous social groups whose orientations and be-
haviour, in terms of the two assumptions 
referred to, are crucial for development: man-
agers, workers, the State bureaucracy, the 
middle strata, the political élite and the intel-
lectuals. But he gives priority to the first two, 
the practical skills of the workers and the 
executive skills of private and public managers. 
The third assumption refers to the general 
economic and political institutional conditions 
which make possible and provide a basis for 
the predominance of the previous assumptions. 
The various models of development are dif-
74
"Relationship between social and economic institu-
tions...", op. cit., p. 33. 
75Ibid. 
ferentiated one from another, in particular, by 
the type of institutional framework they im-
pose; however, they all have the same need for 
stability and continuity. Ownership may be 
public or private, the surplus may be appropri-
ated by the State or by individuals but, in 
principle, all these institutional norms require 
a minimum of stability —as a necessary though 
not sufficient condition— to fulfil sucessfully 
their mission of imposing order. The same 
happens in the political field, since develop-
ment is such a complex process that it needs to 
be organized in a 'programme' which grants 
regularity, continuity and the possibility of 
evolution to its essential mechanism and the 
motivational assumptions and skills which ac-
company it; the political order must play a 
fundamental role in maintaining this process of 
economic and political institutional organiza-
tion. But together with stability in the econom-
ic and political institutional patterns Medina 
underl ines that they must also be mutually 
'consistent' . Indeed, he identifies consistency 
be tween the economic and political rational-
ities —or be tween economic development and 
democracy— as the crucial political problem 
of development. 
At all events, and notwithstanding what 
has been said to the effect that these three 'stra-
tegic' aspects form a 'leitmotiv* emphasized 
many t imes by Medina, he changes them 
when, at the beginning of the 1960s, he shifts 
his view to Latin America. Then, he does not 
br ing into discussion the 'model ' of develop-
ment to be followed, but asks whether any type 
of development will be possible, whether its 
essential mechanism can be applied success-
fully. 
In formulating this concrete question con-
cerning the possibilities of development in 
Latin America he defines the strategic social 
conditions, giving much greater emphasis than 
in the previous trilogy to political aspects. 
Thus the new social conditions which are 
necessary for economic development demand 
that there should exist a social class or group 
which has control of the State, knows how to 
manage it with legitimacy and efficiency, and 
is guided by a set of ideas on development—an 
ideology— which is clear and precise. Stress 
on the civil society and its principal economic 
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elements, managers and workers, has given 
way to the political power structure and its 
privileged classes, the 'political' class and the 
'ruling' class. 
However, these changes do not signify 
definitive theoretical changes of direction, but 
express differing analytical interests appropri-
ate for different objects of analysis, since at 
the same time as he looks towards the political 
problems of development, he insists that his 
colleagues should study industrial managers, 
urban workers and trade unions. Development 
continues, in his. view, to be an overall phe-
nomenon. 
IV 
The challenge of modernization 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Medina finally 
decides to write on Latin America. He leaves 
behind the years when with methodical zeal 
he constructed his conceptual framework, and 
dedicates himself to outlining his interpreta-
tion of social change in this region. 
From a methodological viewpoint, this 
task brings out his idea of history, since he is 
aware that "any sociologist interested in the 
phenomena of change relies, though he may 
not say so, on a theory of historical develop-
ment, a conception of history in its total pro-
cess".76 The basic principles of his conception 
of history are very clear: the history of Latin 
America is a fragment of Western history, since 
the gigantic 'process of transculturation' which 
began with the Conquista was so profound that 
it converted the former into an often active and 
creative part of the latter, and the essential 
feature which gives meaning to Western his-
tory is the process of rationalization, of which 
economic development and social and political 
modernization form part, with specific mani-
festations. This process of rationalization em-
bodies the essence of a tendency which dis-
locates 'traditional society' and tends to form 
the 'new society', modern and industrial. 
However, Medina never believed that the 
process of rationalization was an unstoppable 
forward thrust in the history of Latin America, 
since he never shared in the naive evolution-
ism of many of those who, like him, conceive 
social change as a transition from the traditional 
to the modern. The history of a people may 
7bLecciones de sociología, op. cit., p. 195. 
show evolutionary trends which appear to 
channel it gradually towards an objective, but 
the reason for this happening lies in the deter-
mination of the people, in the motivated efforts 
of its members, and not in the supposed autono-
mous vigour of metahuman forces. 
This important aspect of his conception is 
clarified in the light of what he called "the 
fundamental structure of the historical pro-
cess".77 He holds that this process can be 
conceived similarly to individual action; like 
the latter, it is a complex combination of neces-
sity and freedom, of conditioning and sponta-
neity. Any people possesses material, techni-
cal, social and cultural conditions which, at the 
same time as they contain a range of possible 
alternative actions, fix, the limits of what is 
objectively achievable. The alternative finally 
chosen from among those objectively possible 
will depend on the 'assessment' made of them 
by that people and on the decisions which are 
taken on the basis of the assessment. For that 
reason he asserts that "nothing inevitably 
determines the progress of mankind", which 
will always be the result "of a spontaneous and 
free act within the framework of the inevita-
ble".78 The fundamental structure of the his-
torical process teaches us that it is not possible 
to resolve the 'enigma of the future', despite 
the efforts made in that direction by predictive 
sociology, among other sciences (which he 
reviewed in 1971).79 
17
 Ibid.,p. 191 et seq. 
™rtrirf rv 193 8
 Ibid.', p. . 
In one of the chapters of his article " 'Desengaños del 
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T h e past of a people and its present cir-
cumstances may indicate which are the basic 
tendencies in its orientation and which are the 
possible, and perhaps most probable, paths for 
its future. But they cannot make this prediction 
with certainty, since among the basic circum-
stances and tendencies of a society and its 
future is human mediation; the interpretation 
and evaluation of them by the members of that 
society and the resulting decisions provide 
history with its connotation of freedom and 
indétermination. Man has often felt sure he 
could solve the enigma of the future —religious 
prophecy and scientific forecasting provide 
evidence of these hopes— but Medina prefers 
the more modest recourse of the 'diagnosis', 
which through knowledge of the structure and 
trends of a situation facilitates the choice of 
some action alternative. 
Bearing in mind this "fundamental struc-
ture of the historical process", there is no doubt 
that while for Medina the process of rational-
ization in Latin America is a real historical 
tendency, observable in many different 
spheres of human activity, it is in no way an 
end which will inevitably be fulfilled. Rather, 
it is an objectively possible alternative whose 
present degree of realization and future proba-
bility will vary substantially from one society to 
another. 
If the future always includes a consider-
able margin of uncertainty, why should history 
be conceived as a definite transition from tra-
ditional to modern society? The reason for this 
procedure is in principle methodological, 
since, following Weber, Medina believes that 
the variety of historical phenomena can only 
b e organized, described and explained using 
ideal, pure types. As is well known, these pure 
types are pure in that their elements, because 
of their extreme character, manifest complete 
consistency, an ' ideal ' alignment of meaning. 
They are constructed on the basis of historical 
phenomena but are not a description of them; 
nor are they a theoretical model on the basis of 
which reality can be inferred, or a set of prin-
ciples based on values which serve to guide 
action in that reality. They merely constitute a 
desarrollo", in Discurso sobre políticas y planeación, op. 
cit., which is entitled precisely "El enigma del futuro". 
tool for knowledge, a heuristic instrument 
which enables us to come to know reality by 
contrasting it with the ideal type.80 
M. Weber constructed many ideal types of 
social action and relation on the basis of the 
principle of rationality and believed that he 
had discovered the essence of real social 
phenomena by contrasting them with these 
types; he asserted that reality was not neces-
sarily rational, but that he supposed it to be so 
for heuristic purposes. The distance between 
the pure type and the real phenomena enabled 
him both to highlight the specific features of 
the latter and, on the basis of them, to "put it in 
its p lace" in the almost infinite set of historical 
events, and, in addition, to suggest hypotheses 
concerning the role which some irrational 
elements might play in it. Medina might have 
made similar assertions concerning the me-
thodological significance of his concept of 
"modern industrial society", but neither of 
these thinkers was able to avoid ambiguities 
and misunderstanding; the pure type tended 
—in the minds of others, and sometimes in 
their own— to cease to be a conceptual instru-
ment and become a social objective. Increasing 
rationality, economic development and social 
and political modernization, which are re-
garded as tendencies in the historical process 
and, at the same time, from a methodical view-
point, as ideal types, can only with difficulty 
avoid being transformed similarly into the 
'future images' which must guide the social 
process. At all events, it is worth repeating that 
nei ther of them considered that these pro-
cesses had a path traced in advance or that they 
were directed towards an inevitable aim. If it 
proves possible to construct the modern indus-
trial society, it will be by dint of a hold and 
conscious human effort. 
^ " I n default of an outline interpretation, whether 
entirely valid or not, no light at all can be shed on the 
situation under consideration, and any attempt to influence 
it becomes meaningless. Again, the dimensions of the 
situation in question —and therefore of its interpretation— 
necessitate the simplifying devices for which the theo-
retical term is ' types' or 'models' , and which in any case, far 
from portraying reality as a whole, merely trace the 
prevailing patterns that are indispensable for an under-
standing of those aspects of the existing state of affairs 
which deviate or diverge from them." "Social development 
of Latin America in the post war period" (CEPAL docu-
ment E/CN.12/660, mimeo, p. 2). 
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The traditional structure and its decline 
1. T h e sociological considerations which Me-
dina formulates concerning the economic de-
ve lopment of Latin America are explicitly and 
inevitably historical, since the analysis of the 
presen t situations and its predominant trends 
has its root in the past: "it cannot be maintained 
with regard to Latin America that what carries 
it on towards its future has no continuity with 
what has made it historically what it is".8^_ 
Schematizing his thinking, it may be affirmed 
that he constructs this historical interpretation 
on the basis of a characterization of the funda-
mental features of the traditional structure 
which has been forming since Independence, 
in order subsequently to delineate the nature 
of and etiology of its crisis and the emergence 
of the modern forms of social organization. In 
addition to the guide which this general outline 
provides for him, Medina's historical analysis 
has a precise delimitation which is given it by 
the social requirements of development. In 
concise terms: if the development of Latin 
America must be guided by a perfectly rational 
programme of action and must be based on a 
social class or group which, through control of 
the State, is capable of directing it, the princi-
pal quest ion which must be asked of the 
present situation therefore refers to its ability to 
m e e t these requirements. In analysis, attention 
should be focussed on unravelling the present 
reality in order to learn its potentialities and 
errors in terms of these requirements and 
studying the past in order to find the origins of 
both. Medina 's central question is: what is 
Latin America's present situation vis-à-vis the 
n e e d imposed by these requirements? And his 
reply teaches us that the complex combinations 
of traditional and m o d e m elements which are 
characteristic of our reality represent —even 
for the hopeful who succeed in overcoming 
pessimism— a formidable obstacle to devel-
opment . 
2. Any consolidated social structure relies on 
certain 'supports ' or 'foundations' of a material 
or economico-social, spiritual or ideological 
81CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 16. 
and political nature. The traditional structure 
of independent Latin America —the 'complex 
from which it springs'— had its own: the ha-
cienda, liberalism and the traditional political 
system. 
Among these he highlights the hacienda 
as the fundamental support. Any social struc-
ture has an institution which is its prototype, 
and that which corresponds to the traditional 
structure is the hacienda, a 'privileged' institu-
tion which articulates "from within the im-
mense geographical body of Latin America". 
The hacienda formed Latin America material-
ly, economically and socially. The hacienda is 
essentially a unit of economic production and a 
form of property. But it is also a centre of politi-
cal and military power, which stands out even 
more clearly when the State apparatus of the 
colonial period disintegrates; the support of a 
family structure and the symbol of a family 
name; the basis for a 'social group' with its 
complex system of duties and functions organ-
ized by the authority of the seigneur; and 
finally the foundation of a seigneurial human 
type and way of life. However, it is not the only 
significant economico-social unit in the tradi-
tional structure, since together with it there 
exist the mining centres, and above all the 
cities, which are the seat of commerce and of 
the State and spiritual authorities. Beside the 
landowners stand the urban bourgeoisie, and 
the clash between them constitutes the" most 
important political and ideological conflict up 
to the early decades of the present century. 
If the material foundation for the tradi-
tional structure is the hacienda and the spiri-
tual foundation appears and develops in the 
cities, the focus of the latter is liberalism, that 
"form of living and thinking". Encouraged by 
the opposition to absolutism, the metropolis 
forms the basis of the ideology of the indepen-
dence movement and, accordingly, one of the 
"essential elements of the complex from which 
Latin America sprang". This complex takes 
shape "under the sign of freedom". It is true 
that in those years there were "military revolts, 
coups d'état and numbers of constitutional 
changes; but it is also true that there was never 
open denial of the ideals of the Independence 
movement and that, even under the most 
notable 'strong men ' the letter of the constitu-
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tion still paid respectful tribute to the princi-
ples of liberalism".82 
However , the material and spiritual foun-
dations of the original independence-gestating 
complex are initially contradictory, and in this 
inconsistency —"the first, and perhaps most 
striking paradox" of Latin American history— 
lies not only the cause of many political con-
flicts but also one of the reasons for the frailty 
of liberalism in this part of the world. Even so, 
l iberalism penetrates and takes root in some of 
its doctrinaire manifestations —Manchester 
economic liberalism, constitutionalism, pos-
itivism and so on— to a sufficient extent to 
constitute the only ideology which has exerted 
a d e e p and prolonged influence. 
From these material and spiritual founda-
tions arises a political system which is consoli-
dated when, in the second half of the last 
century, most of the countries of Latin America 
found some compromise formula to resolve 
the conflict be tween the countryside and the 
cities, be tween the agrarian oligarchy and the 
urban intelligentsia. The organization of the 
political institutions —electoral systems, State 
powers , publ ic administration and so on— and 
the relations between them are designed on the 
basis of the European and North American 
liberal democratic models, the political parties 
organize as parties of the 'caucus' type83 and 
the basic political mechanism involves a con-
trast and compromise between two parties 
—liberals and conservatives— whose relations 
are encouraged by areas of common interests 
and orientations and by the symbiosis which 
personal and family support permits. 
Each of the foundations on which the 
traditional structure rests —material, spiritual 
and political— has its own dominant class 
which controls and guides human activity in 
those areas. In his analysis Medina gives 
special attention to two of these classes: the 
S2Ibid., p. 39. 
^"Tradi t iona l local leaders, maintaining close ties 
wi th one another, supported each other on such occasions 
as election, through temporary organizations of party men 
who set in motion the well-known machinery of political 
gatherings, with oral or written statements of proposals and 
promises, bu t the members of these parties did no more 
than cast their vote or provide temporary support, with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, for the actions oí their 
leaders ." Ibid., p . 92. 
'political' and the 'ruling' classes. The political 
class, which emerges from the compromise 
be tween liberals and conservatives, assumes 
responsibility for "putting the State together" 
and constructing the economic infrastructure, 
two essential pre-requisites for development 
in that period. The ruling class, the bearer of 
spiritual power, gives the traditional structure 
the solidity stemming from its continued ad-
herence, despite its changes, to the nucleus of 
the liberal ideology. The two classes are 
closely linked to each other and to the mate-
rially dominant class —in fact, their members 
'circulate' easily in the different areas and are 
clearly aware of belonging to the nucleus of 
power— and this link constitutes a framework 
which connects the various foundations and 
gives consistency to the traditional structure 
as a whole. 
3. When its supports weaken, however, the 
traditional structure begins to decline. The 
hacienda begins to change into a mere profit-
making concern, becomes 'commercialized' 
under the influence of the domestic and spe-
cially external economic dynamism, and the 
consequences of its transformation are as ex-
tensive and profound as the functions it for-
merly played in its role as a fundamental 
support of the traditional structure. Medina 
suggests in passing some of these conse-
quences , such as the psycho-social problems 
—anomie, uprooting— caused by the disinte-
gration of seignuerial paternalism and the ex-
pulsion of the labour force from the countryside 
to the cities. 
Liberalism always suffered from an inher-
ent fragility because it was in contradiction 
with the beliefs and ways of life of the majority, 
the rural population, and because of its Utopian 
nature. The liberal utopia has two decisive 
ingredients: belief in the rationality of man 
and the conception of politics as dialogue and 
peaceful coexistence, and these began to 
suffer from the irrationalist attack which started 
in the second decade of this century and have 
lasted u p to the present not only in Latin 
America, but throughout Western culture. Ra-
tionalist optimism has been succeeded by a 
profound mistrust in the power of" reason, and 
the political standards of coexistence, dialogue 
and compromise are wavered down in favour 
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of " the urge of rash minorities shaping the 
dest inies of their peoples to take blind deci-
sions". T h e crisis of liberalism brings with it a 
profound "ideological disintegration" and 
great "spiritual confusion", from which we 
have still not been able to emerge. But Medina 
warns that these should not "convey the im-
pression of chaos and upheavals" nor encour-
age impossible restorations, but should only 
promote the sometimes profoundly heterodox 
effort of "re-elaboration and reconstruction 
necessitated by liberalism, in both the political 
and economic spheres".84 
T h e decline of the hacienda and the crisis 
of liberalism deprive the traditional political 
system of its basis of support since, just as the 
new ideologies do not succeed in occupying 
the place left by liberalism, the new political 
e lements do not succeed in forming a legiti-
mate and efficient system. On the surface of 
the political process one may note that there is 
no political formula which replaces the old 
two-party system of liberals and conservatives 
and gives it stability; in the background one 
may perceive the cause of this shortcoming: 
there are no new political and ruling classes to 
take the place of those which guided the tradi-
tional society and, as a result, there are no 
strong political parties with clear courses of 
action which are capable of taking charge of 
the transformation. 
In this point, perhaps, lies Medina's 
greatest preoccupation vis-à-vis the transition, 
since he poses time and again the same ques-
tion as that posed by M. Weber with regard to 
Germany at the end of the Bismarck régime: 
which are the social classes and groups that 
are capable of leading and guiding the new 
society? 
As already noted, his response could hard-
ly be called optimistic. "The old oligarchy 
undoubtedly retains some of its capacity to 
command and its notion of national unity, but 
individual interests may weigh too heavily to 
allow it to act effectively. The new leftists, not 
only because of the urgency of their relentless 
daily problems, but because of their training 
and their idealistic dreams, usually have a 
¡"Ibid., p. 65. 
rather limited concept of what national legiti-
macy really means, and scant instinct for power 
and command."85 
The military also usually seek to recover 
lost legitimacy and efficiency but fail "because 
modern technology has become enormously 
complicated and requires compromise, plan-
ning and concerted action which, even with the 
best intention, cannot be called into being 
overnight".86 
Nor do the new masses, which originate 
first and foremost from rural-urban migration, 
represent a solution to the problem of the 
political vacuum. On the contrary, the fact that 
they have been uprooted and the 'mass situa-
tion' in which they live —characterized by 
congestion, insecurity, frustration and resent-
ment— together with nostalgia for the lost 
traditional paternalism, may be the ideal 
breeding ground for demagogy, extremism 
and the thriving of populist parties. The latter, 
erratic, dependen t upon improvisation and 
inefficient, "spell grave danger" for Latin 
America. Thus, these new masses not only 
cannot provide the basis for a solution to the 
political problems, but in their present state 
represent a source of instability; in fact, they 
pose the enormous problem of their responsi-
ble integration into national political life. 
But might not the solution lie in the hands 
of the middle classes? Medina does not answer 
this question lightly, but meditates upon it at 
length, both because of the influence which 
the bourgeoisie had in the development of 
the central countries and because of the impor-
tance attached to the question in the early 
1960s in Latin America. In fact, he poses the 
problem of the middle classes as early as 1955 
and, when analysing social stratification, high-
lights as a central question the small size of 
these strata in most Latin American countries 
—a weakness which is accentuated when one 
considers agriculture and the urban goods-
producing sectors.87 But in the same report he 
warns that the solution does not merely involve 
increasing the number of members of the 
^Ibid. , pp. 98-99. 
mIbid„ p. 99. 
87
 "Tres aspectos sociológicos del desarrollo económi-
co" (1955), in Aspectos sociales..., op. cit., p. 92etseq. 
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middle classes; it is necessary to consider in 
addition other aspects "of a qualitative nature, 
more difficult to analyse, but which are re-
flected in the difficulties involved in their 
rapid adaptation to the new economic con-
ditions".88 
When he takes up the subject again in 
1963, the years appear to have proved him right 
as regards the importance of the qualitative 
aspects; the paradox implied in the "Hoselitz 
hypothes is" —that the countries with larger 
middle classes, such as Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay, are those which manifest the worst 
symptoms of stagnation in those years— he 
explains in terms of ill-directed 'dispositions' 
and 'at t i tudes ' of those classes. In order to 
analyse the most important features of these 
classes he constructs the ideal type of the 
'original bourgeois attitude' and contrasts it 
with the real attitudes of the present middle 
classes in Latin America. The distance he 
measures be tween them is enormous. The 
bourgeois culture which stimulated capitalist 
deve lopment in the centres was a complex 
combination of a "will for economic transfor-
mation", in which predominated the tendency 
to accumulation and investment, the spirit of 
innovation, risk and competition, the moral 
exaltation of labour, asceticism, and so on; a 
"will for independence vis-à-vis the State", 
which demanded that the State should fulfil its 
role in guaranteeing the rules, but rejected its 
economic intervention beyond the strict limits 
which were laid down for it; and a "will for 
social reform", which was expressed in the 
supreme values of freedom and equality. If the 
present bourgeoisie in the centres has already 
moved a considerable distance away from this 
ideal type, our middle classes have never even 
come close to it. On the contrary, although 
there have been slight indications of these 
attitudes in this part of the world, most of the 
members of the middle classes have endeav-
oured to adapt to the predominant economic 
and political patterns rather than trying to 
transform them radically. They are 'faceless' 
middle classes, which do not respond to Me-
dina's appeal: "where do we find the self-
control and discipline of the true creators of 
mlbid., p. 95. 
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modern capitalism the energy and austerity of 
the young samurai who built up modern Ja-
pan?".8 9 In any case, even if it proved possible 
to create middle classes which were aggres-
sive, ambitious and accumulation-minded —an 
'acquisitive bourgeoisie'— there would not be 
enough of them to guarantee development, 
since what they can do depends in the final 
analysis on the "calibre and resolve of the 
'political class' and on the guidance that can 
be provided by the 'pouvoir spirituel' of the 
'ruling class' ".w 
4. When evaluating the results of economic and 
social development in Latin America, a feeling 
of ambivalence is inevitable: these results are 
simultaneously positive and unsatisfactory, 
some progress has been made but not enough, 
and accordingly achievements are intermin-
gled with shortcomings and frustrations. 
Medina 's sociological explanation is clear: this 
is so because it has not been possible to affirm 
resolutely the economico-social, ideological 
and political supports of the new society. Since 
the traditional supports are incompatible with 
the requirements of modernity, modernity can 
only be achieved if the foundations which are 
consistent with it predominate. But why has 
it not been possible to consolidate the founda-
tions of modernity? Because, in fact, they coexist 
and combine with the traditional foundations, 
giving rise to a structurally heterogeneous 
society whose development is thereby 
hindered. 
As is obvious, this combination of tradi-
tional and modern features can be explained 
both by the lack of vigour of the modern 
elements and by the survival capacity of the 
traditional elements. Is the absorption of the 
middle classes by the traditional structure a 
consequence of the weakness of the middle 
classes or of the strength of the traditional 
structure? In so far as this is a question of 
relative weakness or strength, it is not easy to 
resolve, and accordingly Medina does not 
finally opt for either. In "Economic develop-
ment in Latin America —sociological consider-
ations" he gives greater emphasis, to the 
weakness of the modern elements, while in 
89CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 84. 
mlbid., pp. 85-86. 
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the introduction to "Social development of 
Latin America in the post-war period" he 
presents his well known hypothesis on the 
'flexibility' of the traditional structure which 
absorbs or assimilates modern elements 
without modifying its basic foundations. "The 
' traditional ' structure has been relatively per-
meable , and ... this permeability has enabled 
it to absorb such elements of 'modernity' as 
it has needed without damage to the structure 
itself."91 
This heterogeneity has taken a wide vari-
ety of forms. Sometimes it involves the mere 
persis tence of" traditional forms, as in the case 
of some agrarian social relationships; in others, 
t he traditional structure assimilates modern 
e lements without being radically modified, 
as in the example already given of the middle 
classes; in many others hybrid forms emerge 
and predominate which are neither traditional 
or modern, since they correspond to the transi-
tion, as occurs in the clientage system and in 
populist movements and régimes; and, finally, 
the decl ine of the traditional forms may lead 
to 'gaps ' which are partially and inadequately 
filled by diverse elements, as in the ideological 
confusion caused by the decline of the liberal 
ideology. 
At all events, Medina believes that the 
coexistence of traditional and modern ele-
ments is the feature which defines the situa-
tion in Latin America at the beginning of the 
1960s and that, in addition, the agreements 
are more important than the conflicts in this 
coexistence. "What is important is not so much 
the differences and tensions between two 
different ways of life, as the thread of their 
continuity — in other words, their interpreta-
tion, the reactions of the backward sectors 
and the efforts towards expansion of the most 
advanced."9 2 The latter is the reason for which 
h e also rejects the so-called "structural dual-
ism" which was so fashionable in those days. 
Finally, mention should be made of the 
problem of external influences. The short 
outl ine in the preceding pages might give the 
91CEPAL document E/CN.12/660, mimeo, pp. 5-6. 
92CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 19. 
erroneous impression that Medina does not 
attach due importance to external influences 
in the development of Latin America. In fact, 
however, he emphasizes the "tremendous 
impact on the history of Latin America (and 
indeed, on the Hispanic world in general) of 
events taking place outside it, more than once 
with adverse effects" and it is not a question 
of the influence of isolated facts, since because 
this region is part of the Western world, the 
stages in its politico-social history "coincide 
with specific moments in European history 
(the only universal history at that time) until 
we reach the period of the world wars".93 These 
general references are useful in order not to 
repeat some already cited examples of external 
influences, such as those which were mani-
fested in the 'comercialization' of the tradi-
tional hacienda and in the break-up of liber-
alism. 
5. T h e outline of Medina's sociological view 
in the preceding pages is very schematic, 
since the concentration by the author into ideal 
types is compounded by the brevity of this 
survey. Many theoretical suggestions and 
erudite digressions which enrich the original 
texts have had to be excluded in order to high-
light the most important propositions, both 
methodological and theoretical. 
At all events, it is obvious that at the 
beginning he is somewhat disappointed when 
his analysis leads him to conclude that social 
classes or groups which could stimulate the 
development of Latin America do not appear 
to exist. But instead of depressing him, the 
certainty of the existing difficulties finally 
strengthens his faith; he says to himself: "let 
hope tr iumph over any scepticism" and he 
asserts that despite everything "Latin America 
fará da sé". From that moment, the middle 
of the 60s —both his and those of the century— 
Medina looks forward, towards the new soci-
ety, and from then on all his writings will be 
attracted by the "enigma of the future". 
T h e society of the future will inevitably 
be the product of human decisions, choices 
be tween alternatives, and Medina begins by 
clarifying which are the most important, both 
93lbid.t pp. 16-17. 
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in the technico-economic and the political 
and sociological fields. Leaving the first of 
these aside, as they are very well known in the 
relevant literature, Medina sets out four politi-
cal choices relating to economic development: 
laisser faire or State intervention; open or 
closed growth; the claims of power or those 
of the general weal; and, most serious of all, 
whe the r the inevitable sacrifice is to fall on 
some or on all. From the sociological viewpoint 
there are three choices: whether economic 
deve lopment will be accompanied by reforms 
in the social structure and to what extent; 
whe ther a general spirit of discipline is to 
prevail; and whether the support and participa-
tion of the people will be encouraged. As is 
obvious, these do not represent "irreducible 
opposit ions" but alternatives between which 
different possibilities exist. Medina —in his 
role as a technician— emphasizes that what is 
important is to choose, to decide, and to do so 
in such a way that the final result of the choice 
moulds a coherent picture which will serve to 
guide action. 
In order to make these choices clearer, 
Medina outlines the two models of society 
which, in his view, represent the most signifi-
cant historical 'options' for the developing 
world: the "Soviet model" and the "Western 
formula".94 And if he already gives indications 
of his preferences when he sets out the political 
and sociological options in the abstract, when 
dealing with those 'historical types' of society 
he sheds his technical neutrality and declares 
himself openly for the Western formula. For 
that reason his reflections on the new society 
—which encompass the last fifteen years of 
his life— do not constitute an abstract, neutral 
shuffling among possible actions, but the de-
fence of his choice of democratic society — a 
defence which was as passionate as his charac-
ter, very little given to stridency, would permit. 
In defending his utopia of democratic 
society he warns from the outset that the 
greatest danger lies in the tendency, which 
M H e deals with the two models in "Economic devel-
opment in Latin America —sociological considerations" 
(CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 107 et seq); 
and in "El desarrollo y su filosofía", in Filosofía, educación 
y desarrollo, op. cit., p. 17 et seq. 
reappears time and again over the centuries, to 
sacrifice democracy on the altar of economic 
efficiency. And this is certainly the reason for 
which he rejects the Soviet model. "The totali-
tarian formulae, Soviet and other, may be more 
efficacious in many eventualities, but a man 
who is heir to the best European tradition will 
always prefer the possibility of dialogue or, 
to put it another way, he will prefer the perhaps 
intangible value of legitimacy to the pragma-
tism of efficiency."*15 But the idea has also 
penetrated deeply into many of those who 
inclide towards the Western formula, who 
assume that an authoritarian régime is the 
purgatory through which the countries which 
embark on economic development without an 
appropriate political framework must pass. 
Medina rejects this idea; for him it is essential 
to find a path to development which maintains 
faith in the possibility of democratic coexis-
tence. 
"There is always a hope that, even at the 
eleventh hour, men may arise who are able to 
turn ineptitude into efficiency, who are able, 
if need be, to perform a final, saving operation. 
On the other hand, the complete evaporation 
of beliefs, the moral collapse that may result 
from the dissolution of faith —the psychologi-
cal disintegration of a whole society— can only 
lead to hopelessness and 'extremism' ... Psy-
chological disintegration implies, at the most, 
mere selfish resignation, content to gratify its 
most 'human' and immediate interests, and, at 
the least, escape to an 'ivory tower , repre-
sented, perhaps, by one of the world religions. 
Let us, then, face this possibility —as is fitting 
for adult, mature beings— and at the same time 
let us hope, and still more firmly determine, 
that it be not translated into fact."96 
Democracy and planning 
1. T h e defence of the utopia of democratic 
society is the leitmotiv of what was later to be 
the final stage of his intellectual task. Indica-
tions of it certainly exist throughout his work, 
but from the beginning of the 1960s it begins to 
stand out as his principal concern, which he 
9 5 CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 127. 
mIbid., pp . 164-165. 
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will never abandon. The justification for his 
defence is simple: if one is going to fight for a 
new society, it must be worth living in. For 
would it be worth while fighting for base or 
ignoble values? 
Within his sociology of development the 
subject of democracy appears for the first time 
in I960,97 in relation to the institutional condi-
tions which make possible and lay the founda-
tions of the basic social assumptions —motiva-
tional and behavioural— underlying any 
process of economic growth. These economic 
and political institutional conditions may be 
very different in nature, ranging between the 
extreme types of capitalism and socialism, but 
it is essential that they should have a modicum 
of continuity and mutual consistency. 
T h e rationalities which structure and 
guide the economic and political institutions 
must be compatible —this is the functional 
principle which orients his initial political 
analysis. But since in those years he accepted 
the predominance of economic values in devel-
opment , he assumed that the technico-eco-
nomic requirements of development had pri-
ority and asserted that the problem consisted in 
determining the types of political organization 
compatible with it. Undoubtedly there are 
types of political organizations which are not 
compatible with economic development, such 
as, for example, traditional authoritarianism 
and populism. No matter how much they might 
wish to do so, these do not constitute suitable 
political instruments because often they cannot 
overcome the incompetence, corruption, ide-
ological confusion and other difficulties which 
weaken their rationality at both the ideological 
level and at that of the State institutions. In 
general terms, the history of the past few 
centuries indicates that two generic types of 
political organization have existed which are 
compatible with economic development: liber-
al democracy, with its 'original' and 'pluralist' 
variants, and the forms of modernizing autho-
ritarianism which range from the charismatic 
régimes of many underdeveloped countries to 
the régimes of the Soviet type. 
9 7
 In "Relationship between social and economic insti-
tutions...", op. cit., especially p. 35 et seq. See also the final 
pages of chapter I I I of the present study. 
But before continuing with the presenta-
tion of these two types of political organization 
compatible with economic development 
—which rapidly leads to the very heart of 
Medina 's thought— it is necessary to empha-
size that with the years he modifies his initial 
acceptance of the priority of economic values. 
Up to 1970 he holds that the relationship 
between economic development and democ-
racy should properly be viewed from the an-
gle of both economic and political values. In 
other words, if it is fair to ask which types of 
political organization are compatible with par-
ticular economic development objectives —as 
he does in 1960— it is also reasonable to ask 
which types of economic organization are 
consistent with a democratic political order. 
Thus , he says, this relationship "can equally 
well be postulated as an analysis of the political 
conditions of development and as the reverse: 
i.e., an analysis of the economic conditions of a 
given political order, democratic in this 
case...".98 In addition, he warns that it is unde-
sirable to linger too long on an abstract proposi-
tion which perceives this relationship as one 
be tween economic and political rationalities, 
because, in the final analysis, only a few con-
crete questions are of interest: given the pre-
sent economic situation and the intention to 
develop, what are the most appropriate politi-
cal instruments for that purpose? or —given 
certain political conditions which it is sought to 
improve in a certain direction— what are the 
most appropriate economic means to do so? 
2. Democracy is one of the two types of polit-
ical organization compatible with economic 
development, but what should be understood 
by democracy? Just as there is no single mod-
el of economic development, there is no sin-
gle model of democracy; but, equally, just as 
all types of economic development have an 
essential mechanism which they share, de-
mocracy has its fundamental principles with-
out which it ceases to b e what it is. These 
principles relate to the existence of a minimun 
of political representation and respect for the 
sanctions of public opinion, effective social 
participation, and the existence and mainte-
^ I n "Discursos sobre política y planeación", in the 
book already cited of the same name, especially, p . 7. 
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nance of individual rights. The political partici-
pation referred to in the first principle may vary 
and has varied in its forms over time, since 
individualist democracy has given way to 
'pluralist ' democracy. The latter, the only pos-
sible form at present, "consists essentially in 
the political acceptance of the social reality as a 
complex of highly diverse groups, each with its 
individual interests and therefore prone to 
conflicts and disputes with the other groups, 
bu t all complying with a common standard so as 
to seek the most fitting agreement and com-
promise in each case which arises —in con-
sideration, of course, of its temporary charac-
ter".99 But pluralist political participation, with 
its varied forms of formal and informal repre-
sentation, does not exhaust the participation 
which democracy requires. This participation 
must also be social in nature, as is indicated by 
the second principle, and through intermediate 
groups such as the community, the trade unions 
and the enterprise, should stimulate the broad-
ening oí the horizons of the citizens to encom-
pass the State and its international connexions. 
This social participation prompts Medina to 
suggest that 'economic democracy' is an im-
plicit e lement in the very definition of democ-
racy, but he never developed this knotty 
subject.100 
Finally, the third principle emphasizes the 
' l iberal content ' of democracy, its 'assumptions 
based on jus naturale'; in other words, the 
doctrine "that all individuals as persons have 
specific and inalienable rights apart from and 
independent ly of any form of participation: 
natural, civil, political and social rights...".101 
This definition is therefore democratico-
Iiberal, s ince he links the specifically demo-
cratic component of political and social partic-
ipation with the liberal component of natural 
rights and the 'state of law', which is the 
indispensable guarantor of those rights. The 
two components very briefly sum up the fun-
damental values which make it possible for 
existence in society to be worth living. 
3. It is not difficult to accept that political de-




lt)lDiscurso sobre política y planeación, op. cit., p. 43. 
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patible systems, since many historical ex-
amples exist which show that they are. How-
ever, it is not valid to infer, in Medina's 
view, that this observable empirical relation-
ship be tween wealth and democracy means 
that wealth produces democracy or, to put it in a 
more complex way, that the achievement of a 
high level of economic development makes it 
possible to distribute income, access to educa-
tion and other economic and social opportuni-
ties more fairly and to reduce internal tensions, 
thus decisively contributing to the establish-
m e n t of the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the existence of democracy. 
Medina does not deny that these economic 
and social conditions can have favourable 
political effects for democracy, but he believes 
that democracy is founded on its own values, its 
' imponderables ' , which are in no case a mere 
by-product or consequence of economic con-
ditions or values. What he suggests tentatively 
at the beginning he affirms vigorously in his 
last writings: liberal and democratic ideas stem 
from conceptions of jus naturale, and ac-
cordingly have an origin which precedes and is 
independent of those relating to capitalist or 
socialist economic development; they were 
nei ther formulated nor defined on the basis of 
economic development, nor did they propose 
to encourage it directly. Those ideas constitute 
beliefs concerning political legitimacy; they 
are, if you will, an illusion, but they have 
considerable autonomy vis-à-vis economic cir-
cumstances. For that reason, he opposes to the 
'materialistic' relationship between wealth and 
democracy the 'idealistic' relationship which 
stresses first and foremost the value of beliefs, 
" the importance of long-accepted imponder-
ables".102 Many factors help to weaken or 
strengthen democratic values and behaviour 
—as comparative historical analysis shows— 
but none of them can be raised up to the status 
of their sole cause. Between the structural 
conditions and the historical results — let us 
once again remember this central proposition 
of Medina 's— stands human mediation with its 
value-based decisions. 
This defence of democracy for what it is in 
itself, as a socio-political value, prompts him 
102CEPAL document E/CN.12/646, mimeo, p. 144. 
JOSE MEDINA E C H A V A R R I A Î AN INTELLECTUAL PROFILE / Adolfo Gurrieri 161 
to reject any conception which attempts to 
base its legitimacy on other foundations. In 
this regard he expresses his disagreement 
with M. Weber and J. Schumpeter, who, con-
vinced of the weakness of the foundation 
based on jus naturale, endeavoured to justify 
democracy by its instrumental value, its ca-
pacity, as an institutional procedure, to find 
responsible leaders or renew ruling teams 
smoothly. In the same way, he agrees with the 
radical criticism of the present democracies 
in the centres, in the sense that the nub of the 
crisis lies in the fact that the ruling groups 
have not been capable of maintaining the 
original principles of legitimacy —built on the 
values of freedom and equality— and as a 
result have justified their rule in terms of their 
economic achievements, the constant expan-
sion of wealth. Medina agrees that democracy 
is substantially weakened, as a principle of 
political organization, when it is deprived of 
its foundations in jus naturale, the specific 
values which gave it origin and meaning, and 
when it is justified only in terms of its useful-
ness as a means for achieving given political 
or economic ends. 
4. It has already been noted that the proposi-
tions set out by Medina concerning the rela-
tionship between economic development and 
democracy change, between the 1960s and the 
1970s, in the direction of increasingly vigorous 
defence of the relative autonomy of demo-
cratic values vis-à-vis economic circumstances 
and values. But in addition a very important 
change in the intellectual climate of political 
sciences occurs between those years. At the be-
ginning of the 1960s there was great confidence 
in the possibility of expanding and consolidat-
ing democracy in the countries of Latin Ameri-
ca, and in doing so in a way largely consistent 
and parallel with economic growth, Medina 
was not so optimistic in those years; rather, the 
disappointed undertone in his "Economic 
development in Latin America —sociological 
considerations" —due to the incompetence or 
weakness of the middle classes, the insuffi-
cient transformation of the agrarian structure, 
the distortions of populism, and so on— also 
influences his assessment of the possibilities 
of democracy in Latin America. At all events, 
the theoreticians of modernization —those 
with whom Medina engages most frequently 
in a dialogue in his writings on these subjects— 
were confident then of the future of democracy; 
Medina only reminds them of the intrinsic 
value of democratic values and, in the face of 
the optimism generated in them by the equat-
ing of wealth and democracy, underlines his 
conviction that democratic values will not be 
achieved as a bonus to economic growth, but 
must be sought for themselves. 
From the end of the 1960s the difficulties 
faced by the reformist régimes and the reality 
of authoritarian governments weakened the 
most solid hopes, and those theoreticians of 
modernization who believed that the relatively 
parallel achievement of economic growth and 
democracy was possible began to question 
whether democratic institutions which are 
regarded as embryonic, unstable and immature 
could support rapid economic growth and bear 
the transformations inherent in it. In the face 
of these prospects, and convinced that a mini-
mum level of economic development was a 
necessary condition for achieving a stable 
democracy, they believed that it would be best 
to organize the political systems on the basis 
of 'mobilization', in other words, the organiza-
tion and application of all available human 
resources in a manner which did not exclude 
political compulsion, if that was considered 
necessary to achieve the economic objectives. 
In fact, they proposed to sacrifice democratic 
political institutions to economic efficiency, 
convinced that the authoritarian régime would 
be a transitory episode since the historical 
process —in the customary terms of the evolu-
tionism of the theory of modernization—would 
lead to the inevitable achievement of wealth 
and democracy. Thus, still according to this 
view, "the economically backward countries 
cannot follow the traditional paths of the 
democratic countries in order to overcome 
their backwardness, and ... for that reason they 
will not escape an authoritarian period, either 
as a result of a process of mobilization initiated 
by a doctrinal group or a charismatic figure, or 
as the result of an increase in the decision-
making capacity of the executive sector of the 
inherited State".103 
losDiscurso sobre política y planeación, op. cit., p. 116. 
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Medina also vigorously rejects this point 
of view. Firstly, and in accordance with what 
was said above, he disagrees with the econo-
mism of this view which subordinates the' 
achievement of democratic values to economic 
growth; secondly, he emphasizes the Weberian 
view that a stable political order cannot be sup-
ported merely by coercion, but also requires 
the spontaneous consent of the governed, their 
self-discipline. The latter is evident from an 
analysis of the historical experience of the 
authoritarian régimes oriented towards eco-
nomic development, which shows that the 
very efforts of these régimes to ensure eco-
nomic and educational transformations diver-
sify the society and thus facilitate the emer-
gence of forms of conflict and aspirations for 
democratization similar to those it was as-
sumed they would eliminate. So why should 
this experience not be taken into account 
before throwing democratic institutions over-
board? Finally, this view appears to vary in its 
applicability depending on the level of devel-
opment of the democratic values and institu-
tions achieved by each country at a given 
moment; in fact, it seems even more regret-
table and inappropriate to disrupt democratic 
institutions and beliefs when —as in many 
countries of Latin America— they have already 
been maturing for many years. But Medina is 
consistent to the end: even in cases of little or 
no democratic tradition it would be advisable 
to start along the path of development hand in 
hand with democracy, since as many historical 
cases show, when democratic ideals are strong 
they can help to make bearable the social and 
political disruption and maladjustment pro-
duced by economic growth because of its ups 
and downs and the structural transformations 
it brings with it. 
5. Economic development, as a process rela-
tively open to human decisions, means choos-
ing between technico-economic, political and 
social alternatives, and Medina emphasizes 
time and again, from the beginning of his 
sociology of development, that planning must 
play a fundamental role in preparing for, 
making and implementing these choices. For 
that reason there should be no surprise at the 
preference he gave to this subject in his last 
years and his lengthy explorations of the rela-
tionship between democracy and planning; in 
fact, planning is a special form of looking at 
economic development, which accentuates its 
political components by considering it as a 
process of decision-making and implementa-
tion. But the greatest attraction that the subject 
of planning has for Medina is that through it 
he once again engages in dialogue with some 
of his favourite interlocutors: with Comte and 
his hope of achieving a rational ordering of 
society; with Weber and his prophetic vision 
of a disillusioned world, where the excesses 
of instrumental reason threaten the freedom 
of man; with Mannheim and his conception of 
planning as the instrument of a total transfor-
mation of society to achieve the broadening 
and defence of freedom. 
Democracy, as has already been pointed 
out, is worth while for its own sake, because of 
the values which it embodies, which are found-
ed in the principles oí jus naturale. This is the 
final bastion of the position which Medina 
defends; but there are other, earlier bastions 
which also help to sustain democratic ideals 
by pointing to their instrumental value for 
economic development. This is so, in princi-
ple, in the case of Medina's reflections seeking 
to demonstrate that democratic planning is 
possible because there is no fundamental in-
compatibility which prevents the planning of 
economic development from being carried out 
within a democratic political system. 
However, the defence of democratic plan-
ning encounters difficulties linked with the 
fact that there exist other components of plan-
ning, the technical and administrative compo-
nents, which have also attempted to shape it 
in their image and likeness, giving rise to what 
Medina calls 'bureaucratic' and 'technocratic' 
utopias of planning.104 The Utopian component 
of both consists precisely in the fact that they 
claim to concentrate the power involved in the 
decision-making process of planning in the 
hands of their respective social supports: bu-
reaucrats and technicians. The bureaucratic 
Utopia holds that the bureacracy must have the 
decisive role in planning, since planning can-
not function efficiently without the rational 
104See "La planeación en las formas de la racionali-
dad", in Discurso sobre política y planeación, op. cit. 
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apparatus provided by the bureaucracy; the 
expansion and consolidation of rational ad-
ministration do indeed accompany and under-
pin the formation of the modern State and the 
deve lopment of the economy. But technicians 
and scientists maintain that they, or science 
and technology alone, have at least as good a 
record as bureaucracy to justify their directing 
p lanning; in order to prove this assertion, they 
say, it suffices to glance at the role they have 
played in the economic and political process 
in recent years. 
T h e realization of one or other of the 
utopias is not a simple matter, since it requires 
the satisfaction of some socio-political and 
cognitive conditions which are difficult to 
realize in present circumstances. Firstly, it 
calls for the acceptance or imposition of the 
intellectual supremacy of either the bureau-
cracy or the technocracy, for which purpose 
they must be capable of showing irrefutably 
that the knowledge they can attain is absolute 
and sufficient; secondly, it is necessary for this 
intellectual supremacy to be converted into 
political supremacy, defeating the other groups 
which are also fighting for power, and, finally, 
the bureaucrats or technocrats must succeed in 
legit imating the resulting socio-political order 
made up of an enlightened —bureaucratic or 
technocratic— élite and the subject masses. 
At all events, Medina deals with both 
utopias in detail, since they are present in 
many of the prospective analyses which are 
be ing carried out in the developed countries, 
and stand at the centre of many sociological 
and philosophical polemics. Furthermore, he 
wishes to contrast them with the democratic 
utopia and, in passing, to launch a few darts at 
those in Latin America —and there are not a 
few of them— who have technocratic or bu-
reaucratic illusions. Science, technology and 
administration, in Medina's opinion, play a 
fundamental role in planning, but, at least for 
the moment , they cannot dream of achieving a 
monopoly of power in the short term, still less 
be l ieve that through them it will be possible 
to achieve the hope of shifting from complex 
power relations among men to the straight-
forward administration of things. 
T h e democratic utopia of planning reaf-
firms the political component which the other 
utopias bel ieve they can overcome, and main-
tains that the decision-making power in plan-
ning should in the final analysis rest with the 
people and its political representatives. In an 
extreme version, which rejects the role of the 
scientists, technologists and bureaucrats, it is 
obviously unattainable. But as regards its view 
of the final depositaries of political power, it 
has much better arguments and background 
than the other utopias to legitimate itself. 
T h e specific question which is of interest 
when considering the possibility of democratic 
planning is: can planning, with its character-
istic institutional techniques and mechanisms, 
fit within the democratic system? Medina 
replies in the affirmative, since he believes 
there is no incompatibility between their po-
litical structures or functions. Rather, he asserts 
that they share some very similar political 
functions, such as those of articulating values 
and linking them with the objectives aimed at 
and the means of achieving them; maintaining 
and making possible socio-political communi-
cation through participation; discovering gaps 
and inadequacies in resources, and hence 
promoting their creation and rational alloca-
tion; and constituting symbols of legitimacy to 
guide the attitudes of the population. 
But, in particular, democracy is a system 
of choices which articulates the alternatives 
that arise in all the important spheres of the 
life of a society and supplies channels for 
participation in the decisions referring to them, 
and there is no structural obstacle to its also 
including the economic choices specific to 
planning in its institutional machinery. Clear-
ly, Medina does not deny that there are con-
crete difficulties in this process, but he em-
phasizes that they do not derive from any as-
sumed inconsistency between the basic prin-
ciples which orient both democracy and plan-
ning. However, consistency between the in-
stitutions and machinery of either —their 
'structural relationship'— should not be sought 
only at the level of the Parliament and the 
central State apparatus, for the relationship 
of planning to the economic, social, regional 
and community interest groups at all the stages 
of plan formulation and implementation is also 
of importance. At all events, Medina believes 
that as long as the party system functions 
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acceptably it should constitute the principal 
area where the fundamental economic choices 
are compared. 
6. The set of activities which go to make up 
economic planning include, to a greater or 
lesser degree, the most important types of 
rationality whose social bearers are the pro-
tagonists of the utopias outlined. Of course, 
each of them —scientists, technologists, bu-
reaucrats and politicians— participate to some 
extent, during the exercise of their activities, 
in all the types of rationality, but one is specific 
to them and defines what is typical in their role 
in planning. 
The technologist is guided in particular 
by the instrumental or technical rationality, 
which is, essentially, that which endeavours 
to supply the most appropriate means to 
achieve an end, or, given certain means, tries 
to maximize the results, or attempts to predict 
the consequences of an action. In his activities 
he pays special attention to the means or 
instruments to be used for the achievement 
of objectives which he has not selected him-
self. The aims and objectives, the future image 
of the society which it is wished to create, the 
criteria which guide the diagnosis, have not 
been established by him, and he restricts him-
self to preparing models or strategies for action 
in accordance with guidelines given to him 
beforehand. 
The bureaucrat is guided in his rational 
activities by specific 'procedures' laid down 
by norms and regulations; he also of course 
knows something of the reality of the things 
involved in his activities, but his typical ra-
tionality is the 'functional' rationality, which 
organizes the implementation of an activity in 
accordance with certain administrative pro-
cedures whose establishment and modifica-
tion in the final analysis fall outside his strict 
competence. The politician develops in his 
activities a 'political' rationality which is di-
vided into two forms: firstly, it has the princi-
pal task of taking decisions concerning the 
ends which guide planning as a whole, and 
secondly, it must rationally organize the func-
tioning of the entire process of negotiation 
linked with the taking of decisions. 
Now, if one may be permitted a perhaps 
excessive simplification of Medina's thinking 
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on this complex subject, one may affirm that 
in reflecting on these different rationalities he 
returns to his profoundest existential problems. 
In the first place, he expresses his fears that 
such growth may take place in the technical 
and functional rationalities that it will finally 
impose their criteria —of bureaucratic and 
instrumental 'efficiency'— in spheres of life 
which should be governed by their own au-
tonomous values. In that regard, he repeatedly 
underlines the indispensable role of politics 
in planning, as a decisive affirmation of a value 
content and a hope for material rationality; 
nothing is more foreign to his beliefs than the 
alleged 'futility of polities'. Secondly, he ex-
presses his defence of democratic principles as 
basic criteria which should structure and guide 
this necessary political rationality. 
The undeniable challenges raised by the 
development of reason have led many philoso-
phers and sociologists —and also many youth 
protest movements— to maintain that indus-
trial society is moving towards an impasse as a 
result of the unrestricted predominance of 
technological reason, which has gone beyond 
the sphere of technology and economics and 
now seeks to dominate all human activities to 
the detriment "of other forms of reason, not 
only historical and vital reason, but that sole 
original and all-embracing reason which pro-
vides a basis for man's permanent critical 
reflection on himself and his own creations: 
the Reason which gave birth to the enlightened 
thinking of ancients and moderns".105 
In the face of this 'one-dimensional' social 
organization, which threatens to destroy all 
human freedom, all that seems possible is 
"radical resignation" or "a desperate attitude 
determined to resolve the problem funda-
mentally once and for all". Medina is not in 
agreement with these attitudes: he accepts 
that the process of rationalization has undesir-
able socio-political effects, but the reaction to 
them should not be resignation or apocalyptic 
destruction. Rather, the task involves "firmly 
bringing into play a powerful creative imagina-
tion capable of devising at the appropriate 
time the various political and economic in-
l05Discurso sobre política y planeación, op. cit., p. 87. 
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struments for negotiation and commitment 
which are capable of overcoming it effec-
tively".106 
The process of rationalization is a univer-
sal trend in our time which has made it possible 
to palliate the scourges of poverty and prema-
ture death. We cannot go backwards, rejecting 
progress. But neither is prosperity sufficient 
in itself, and for that reason it is necessary to 
check the excesses of these manifestations of 
reason and fight against the ambitions of tech-
nocratism, economism and bureaucratization. 
In this fight it is necessary to avoid despera-
tion; fortunately, the scientist, the technologist 
and the politician can be well prepared if they 
have learned to respect the dictates of their 
own rationalities, which teach them the dis-
tance which stands between the desirable and 
the impossible. If they are mature they will 
know that the hope for a better society lies in 
"the rigorous analysis of scientific intelligence, 
the critical consideration of enlightened dis-
course and the pragmatic orientation of pru-
dence as political reason".107 
In short, if Medina had permitted himself 
to give a piece of advice, he would have said 
that in the present circumstances of Western 
culture —of which Latin America is a full 
member— the most important objective is to 
defend democratic values and institutions both 
from their traditional enemies and from those 
who, in the belief that they are defending them, 
mistakenly defer them to an uncertain future 
when propitious economic and social condi-
tions exist for their establishment. To be a 
democrat means to uphold their intrinsic prin-
ciples now, fighting to recover them effec-
tively. If institutional maladjustments exist 
because parliament, the parties, the electoral 
system or any other of the institutions do not 
function properly, the required reforms or 
changes must be made in them, without re-
jecting the principles on which they are based. 
If an 'overload' of demands occurs as a result 
of the growing political participation encour-
aged by the economic and social changes, the 
solution is not to eliminate some of them in a 
repressive manner, but to educate the citizenry 
with a view to "bringing about a change in the 
currently impaired or downright perverted 
attitudes of individuals and other social units 
with respect to the State".108 Finally, if demo-
cratic pluralism produces conflicts, it should 
be remembered that "every liberal-democratic 
conception of the political system tends to 
accept as its point of departure the existence 
of opposing interests and ideological positions 
which cannot be finally reconciled at the 
dictates of an absolute truth possessed as such, 
but can only come to temporary arrangements, 
successively amplified to meet the needs of the 
moment, and worked out through agreement, 
compromise and mutual moderation of incom-
patible extremes".109 
V 
Conclusion: Taking stock and looking forward 
1. In 1974, when he was already over 70, 
Medina left his post in the United Nations and 
moved to Spain. He planned the trip as a final 
return after spending half his life in Spanish 
America, but for reasons which it is not appro-
priate to discuss here, he remained in his 
country only a couple of years, after which he 
resettled in Santiago, Chile, and wrote his last 
essays for CEPAL. 
During this European interlude, because 
of his renewed close contact with European 
realities after so much time, he readjusted his 
intellectual perspective and organized his 
problems, approaches and theoretical sugges-
mIbid., p. 92. 
107
 Ibid., p. 92. 
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CEPAL Review., N.° 4, op. cit., p. 133. 
mIbid.,p. 127. 
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tions in a way which was to become definitive. 
In principle, he once again found himself 
face to face with crisis, with the widespread 
feeling in intellectual circles of living through 
a critical time. He felt the presence of a 
"negative tone of feeling" because of the lost 
illusions of the post-war period and, though 
he might disagree on the causes of the crisis, 
he agreed that the end of an era had arrived. 
This awareness of crisis encompasses very 
diverse areas, but there are two which Medina 
underlines with special emphasis: the crises in 
traditional conceptions of development and of 
the international order. 
The crisis in the idea of development 
began to germinate some time ago; it began 
with criticism of the conception of develop-
ment as pure economic growth and a call for 
its scope to be broadened by adding to it the 
ideals of human welfare proposing greater 
fairness in distribution —"narrowing the 
gap"— both between countries and between 
regions and social strata within countries. This 
initial criticism and combination are later 
joined by a concern at waste, with its salient 
features of superfluous consumption, squan-
dering on arms and the exhaustion of non-
renewable resources, and denunciation of the 
destructive action which development has 
brought with it, with consequent ecological 
deterioration and decline in the quality of life. 
In their extreme version, these criticisms 
propose 'other' types of development, which 
totally reject the traditional conception and 
seek the creation of a society which is thrify, 
fair and capable of meeting the basic needs of 
all. 
The traditional conception of the interna-
tional order, which originated in the seven-
teenth century in Europe, is based on the 
existence of territorially sovereing States 
whose principal criterion for action is their 
own raison d'Etat and which maintain be-
tween each other relations based on various 
forms of distribution and exercise of political 
and economic power —dominance of the 
strongest, balance of power, and so on— regu-
lated precariously by international law, which 
has never been able to achieve full compul-
sion. This type of international order is enter-
ing a crisis because problems are arising whose 
solution cannot be achieved by a single State 
or a few States, and because forms of interna-
tional relations are emerging which spread 
beyond the borders of the States, such as 
intergovernmental bureaucracies, regional 
associations and communities, and transna-
tional enterprises. 
But behind these important manifestations 
of the critical consciousness, Medina discovers 
the old subjects —'his' old subjects— which 
once again lead to the discovery of "the drama 
of Western culture". The thread which links 
all of them, old and new, is the perennial 
struggle for freedom, the "repeated fight to 
avoid or limit the various forms of coercion to 
which the individual is subjected ... it is a 
criticism of authority, in its different manifesta-
tions in our reality ... in the conditions of 
national or international life".110 In this way 
there reappear both the hope that the develop-
ment of reason will'bring with it the conquest 
of poverty, disease and premature death and 
make it possible to achieve full human ad-
vancement, and the threat that the unilateral 
predominance of one of the forms of reason 
will culminate in the coercions of technocrat-
ism, bureaucratism, political absolutism and 
economism. In short, there reappears his 
persistent concern to ensure that the essential 
process of rationalization does not subordinate 
or prevent the meeting of the "moral and 
aesthetic needs of the individual, his effective 
desires, the quality and dignity proper to 
human life and the permanent yearning for 
communication".111 
In the face of these problems, old and new, 
salient and profound, Medina specifies the 
basic elements of the appropriate approach 
to tackle them, for the purposes of both inves-
tigation and action. Firstly, he emphasizes the 
need to adopt a universalist attitude which 
makes it possible to achieve a global view-
point; this attitude is founded on the fact that 
all the parts into which the present-day world 
can be divided are interdependent, that their 
crucial problems are universal, so that efforts 
110
"Las propuestas de un nuevo orden internacional 
en perspectiva", El Trimestre Económico (Mexico), Vol. 
XLV N.° 179 (July-September 1978), p. 534. 
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to solve them should also be universal, and 
that the 'compact whole' of the social circum-
stance of man is not a national society or a 
region but the world as a whole. Secondly, he 
emphasizes the need for a prospective orienta-
tion which endeavours as far as possible to less-
en the indétermination and uncertainty always 
involved in the "enigma cf the future''; this 
perspect ive orientation should avoid the 
extremes of "impatient pragmatism" and the 
construction of irrelevant utopias. Utopias are 
necessary and the lack of them "may perhaps 
b e indicative of a serious inadequacy in the 
interpretation of the present",112 but, in so far 
as one is a mere witness or minor protagonist, 
one must not undervalue the realistic analysis 
of what 'can' be done in given objective condi-
tions. Thirdly, he points to the importance of 
power relationships at the international level, 
since they have a substantial influence on the 
nature of the major universal problems and 
the solutions which could be found to them, 
and constitute the indispensable framework 
which limits any concrete national or interna-
tional analysis or action. 
These basic components—the universalist 
at t i tude, the prospective orientation and the 
dominant influence of international power 
relationships— are present in much of modern 
academic and political thinking, but they are 
not original. Medina suggests that behind them 
stands the old conception of sociology as the 
reflection of an era critical of itself, as the "self-
awareness of a historic moment"; a conception 
which attracted him so much at the beginning 
of the 1940s under the influence of H. Freyer. 
2. T h e implicit balance sheet drawn up by 
Medina, stimulated by his stay in Europe, 
convinced him that while there exist at the 
present time problems and approaches which 
respond to the specific challenges of the mo-
ment , they are also closely related —as could 
hardly be otherwise— to the intellectual and 
political concerns and efforts which have been 
taking root for a long time in the heart of 
Western culture. 
l l 2
"La t i n America in the possible scenarios oïdéten-
te", CEPAL Review, N.° 2 (second half of 1976), p. 19 
(United Nations publication, Sales N.°: E.77.II.G.2). 
However, in his final years, he is con-
vinced that the problem of peace stands out 
above the remaining problems and has deci-
sive influence on them; his thesis is that all 
the important issues of the present era depend 
on how world peace is achieved and consoli-
dated. The problem is obviously not new, and 
Medina himself had already tackled it towards 
the end of the Second World War,113 but he 
now returns to face it with renewed vigour, 
aware of the dangers which total war would 
involve. 
Thus, he dedicates a good part of his last 
efforts to an analysis of the changes which 
have occurred in international relations in 
recent decades, and he does so in a way which 
has certain formal similarities with that which 
he sketched in relation to development in Latin 
America. In fact, these changes are conceived 
as if they had a leading tendency: the transi-
tion from the structure of relations of the cold 
war to that specific to detente, and the latter, 
like development, is both a historical tendency, 
a continuing process, and an ideal for which 
it is worth fighting and which will only be 
attained by means of human effort. 
The structure of relations specific to the 
cold war is based on the confrontation between 
the two principal contenders, which assumes 
the nature of total antagonism. Discourage-
ment of open confrontation between them lies 
in their military 'parity' and in their shared 
fear at what would be its inevitable result: the 
'holocaust' of humanity. Both contenders 
represent and propound socioeconomic sys-
tems that they perceive as absolutely antag-
onistic, which gives dogmatic rigidity to the 
ideas and institutions guiding any internal and 
external policy, so that they become 'pil-
larized'. This inflexibility, which affects not 
only the principal contenders but also die many 
who cannot avoid their influence, together 
with the nuclear threat, do not, however, 
prevent both from obtaining distinct successes 
in their economic growth; perhaps as result of 
their "open emulation". 
Détente means a general relaxation of 
tension at the international level and the firm 
113Consideraciones sobre el tema de la paz (Mexico 
City, Banco de México, 1945). 
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establishment of the foundations of durable 
peace. In Medina's view, tension has lessened 
a little in recent years and positive steps have 
been taken towards détente, but there is still 
an objective possibility of a freezing of the 
present situation (competitive détente), a 
backsliding towards previous stages typical 
of the cold war (conflictive détente), or a move 
forward to durable and harmonious peace (co-
operative détente). 
Medina places all his hopes in the latter. 
However, he does not conceive it as a perma-
nent and absolute final stage but as a target 
whose achievement would not only be valu-
able in itself, but would open up new éco-
nomie, political and cultural prospects at the 
international and national level. 
From the viewpoint of international poli-
tical relations this would make it possible to 
leave behind the old system of security policies 
based on the defence of national sovereignty, 
in favour of a globalist or universalist approach 
aiming at genuine world interdependence: the 
consolidation of this tendency would permit 
both growing flexibility in international actions 
—'desatellization'— and the establishment and 
strengthening of world authorities to deal with 
problematical issues, as well as the reduction 
of localized wars. As for international economic 
relations, the most important consequences 
would take the form of a general attitude of 
co-operation, the expansion of the international 
market and the predominance of multilateral 
over bilateral relations. At the national level 
•it would produce two effects of the greatest 
importance: firstly, international concord 
would promote the formation and strengthen-
ing of democratico-liberal régimes; and sec-
ondly, it would contribute to "ideological 
decentralization". This process, by destroying 
the previous rigidity, would stimulate the 
search for new ideas and policies and their 
application in development strategies and 
permit the application of measures which are 
more flexible, pragmatic and adaptable to 
specific circumstances. 
In short, democracy at the national level 
and co-operative détente at the international 
level are the two banners which constitute 
the essence of Medina's axiological legacy. Do 
they merely represent the optimistic and 
Utopian enthusiasm of a man of good will? 
Perhaps, but such men "like those who believe 
in Reason ... continue to be the salt of the 
earth".114 
Note on José Medina's academic background 
Medina was born in Castellón de la Plana 
(Spain) on 25 December 1903. He studied in 
the National Institutes of Valencia and Barce-
lona (1914-1920), and in the Universities of 
Valencia and Madrid (1920-1926), obtaining 
the title of Doctor of Jurisprudence. Later he 
was a Fellow in the University of Paris (1926) 
and Reader in the University of Marburg, 
Germany (1931-1932). On his return to Spain 
he was Legal Officer to the Cortes (1932-
1936) and Professor of the Philosophy of Law 
in the University of Murcia (1934). During a 
large part of the civil war he was Secretary 
and later Chargé d'Affaires in the Spanish 
Legation in Warsaw, Poland (1937-1939). 
Exiled in Mexico, he was Editor of the 
Colección de Sociología of the Fondo de 
Cultura Económica (1939-1944); Professor of 
Sociology in the Autonomous National Univer-
sity of Mexico (1939-1944); and Professor and 
Director of the Centre for Social Studies and 
Director of the publication Jornadas in the 
Colegio de México. Following a short period 
as visiting Professor in the National University 
of Colombia (1945), he became Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Puerto Rico 
(1946-1952). On 1 August 1952 he began his 
work in CEPAL; first as an Editor (1952-1955), 
but later moving on to duties relating to social 
development. In 1957-1958 transferred to 
UNESCO to become the first Director of the 
School of Sociology of the Latin American 
Faculty of Social Sciencies, returning to 
CEPAL in 1959-1963. On 30 November 1963 
he joined the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), where 
he was Director of the Social Development 
Division until his retirement on 30 June 1974. 
After spending some time in Spain he returned 
to Santiago, Chile, and co-operated with 
CEPAL until his death on 13 November 1977. 
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